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Chapter 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Context 
The Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN),1 40 years after its 
establishment in 1967, recently incorporated regional human rights principles into its 
Charter (the ASEAN Charter)2 together with a human rights mechanism.3 Whilst the 
ASEAN community aims at common objectives for peace, stability and prosperity, other 
values constructing ASEAN communities are mutual respect, consensus, and tolerance. 
The challenge in implementing the ASEAN Charter lies in the region’s cultural diversity 
and notions of state sovereignty embraced by many ASEAN states.  
 
ASEAN member states are experiencing an accelerating process in the 
regionalism of human rights. States have different interpretations of, and practices 
related to fundamental human rights, although many have joined with core 
international human rights instruments. The establishment of ASEAN’s 
Intergovernmental Commission of Human Rights (AICHR) in 2008 was a radical step in 
regionalism of human rights. 4 AICHR’s mandate fits into the roadmap of making the 
ASEAN Charter work for all member states. Although ASEAN states have gradually 
committed to progress on human rights by setting up this sub-regional human rights 
mechanism by means of a cosmopolitan approach, the ASEAN charter as the regional 
constitution, the AICHR as the regional human rights mechanism, and the ongoing 
                                                 
1
 At its establishment in 1967 ASEAN included 10 countries: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thai Land and Vietnam.  
2
 Refer to the ASEAN Charter, ratified fully by all 10 states, which came into force on 15 December 2008 
3
 The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission for Human Rights was set up on 23 October 2009 
4
 Terms of Reference for AICHR, session 4. (AICHR) has its early mandate to “conduct study in thematic 
issues; to develop common approaches and positions on human rights matters of interest to ASEAN; 
therefore to promote full implementation of ASEAN human rights instruments”. 
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Human Rights Declaration, the ASEAN human rights mechanism is based upon 
consensus between member states and non-intervention with each other’s affairs.  
 
ASEAN was established on 8 August, 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing 
of the Declaration (ASEAN Declaration also named Bangkok Declaration). The founding 
members of the Association were Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the 
Philippines and they shared the common goal of eliminating violence and instability in 
member states. After the Bali Conference in 1976, the organization began a program of 
economic cooperation, but by the mid-1980s states had generally failed to cooperate. 
Economic cooperation only began to be successful when Thailand proposed a free trade 
area in 1991. Today, ASEAN consists of 10 members including the Philippines, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Cambodia (in 1999), Laos (in 1997), Myanmar (in 
1997) and Vietnam (July 28, 1995). The Association, since the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 1976 confirmed basic principles such as respect 
for all rights and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. 
 
Still now, many ASEAN states do not fully participate in the implementation of 
and adherence to international human rights instruments. They joined these core 
covenants in different stages. Some governments even criticised the universality of 
human rights as defined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 
Even in 1966, when the Covenants of Rights was adopted by UN General Assembly, after 
most ASEAN countries had gained independence, human rights were still not welcomed. 
ASEAN was established with a Charter that commits member states to secure peace, 
democracy, prosperity, security and human rights for the region. 5 Nevertheless, even 
before an effective regional human rights mechanism is established, some ASEAN states 
                                                 
5
 ASEAN Charter. See http://www.asean.org/21069.pdf. The Charter outlines the obligation of 
the member states to uphold principles of rule of law, good governance, democracy and human rights 
(article 1.2: Principle) but also ‘respect fundamental freedoms, promote and protect human rights and 
promote social justice (article 2.2 Principles). Also, the same principles are respect for the different 
cultures, languages and religions of the people of ASEAN, while emphasizing their common values in the 
spirit of unity in diversity”.  
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have ratified key international conventions on human rights but they did not ratify at the 
same period and at the same par. Only Philippines, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia 
ratified all six first core instruments (ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, ICERD, CAT and CRD). Other 
member states either do not ratify yet or have taken only small  steps to implement 
these conventions (see Table 1). The different stage of ratification and implementation 
amongst ASEAN states may explain the difficulties for members to reach the same par of 
implementation of human rights. The remaining issues are that human rights 
conventions often use general formulations and standards – with a certain margin of 
appreciation - and that there is a lack of a sanction system in the UN, apart from through 
the work of the Conventions’ committees.  
 
Whilst ASEAN states have together made commitments on human rights there 
are different levels of implementation of fundamental freedoms, notably freedom of 
expression and information (FOE/I). Many states have established tight restrictions on 
FOE/I on grounds of national security. The challenge in implementing FOE/I is that 
human rights are seen more as political concepts and mechanisms than as a strictly legal 
principle. This means that in many countries there may be a greater openness to 
blurring boundaries between political and legal spheres than is, for example, the case in 
European states.  
 
Experience from the European human rights system is that a regional human 
rights mechanism helps to promote the implementation of international human rights 
norms and standards in regional systems complied with by all member states. The ECHR 
and the ECtHR are attempts to create a more efficient system of adjudication of human 
rights. With regard to FOE/I, in Europe and in European states there has been a process 
of increasing focus on freedom of expression and less tolerance of exceptions to this 
right.  
 
ASEAN Parliamentarians raised the need to build one ASEAN with common 
understandings and practices around FOE/I as they state:  "We believe that the dream of 
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a true ASEAN community and the formation of an ASEAN human rights body must 
recognize free expression, press freedom, and people's access to information as essential 
to human rights". 6 However, norms and standards of human rights will need to be 
accepted and adopted by member states. It is necessary to have clearer interpretation 
and scope of application of the restriction if any. But this process of building consensus 
and adoption may be not an instance.  Through this process, the ASEAN states beg the 
question of how to interpret this fundamental human rights freedom and under what 
modalities and systems states can balance freedom of individuals with other national 
interests to fulfil the regional aim to preserve peace, security and democracy and 
human rights as committed to the ASEAN Charter.   
1.2 Statement of Problem 
FOE/I contain restrictions as provided by Article 19 (3) of the ICCPR. 7 But in the 
ASEAN states, restrictions on FOE/I are often applied within member states’ laws and 
practices. The interpretation of restrictions stated in Article 19 (3) varies amongst 
ASEAN states. Therefore, in application, states may apply a broader range of restrictions 
to protect state interests over the interests of individual citizens in light of Articles 19 (1) 
and (2) of ICCPR. Amongst other notions of human rights, FOE/I is often seen as creating 
the greatest tension in the practices of states in their compliance with international 
human rights standards. In practice, restrictions may not always comply with  the 
principles in Article 19 (3). This means that such practices do not meet the test of 
legitimacy for restrictions on freedom of expression, including being “necessary”, 
“provided by law” and “proportional”. Such restrictions are often based on  grounds of 
‘protecting the nation’ or ‘national security’. In the ASEAN context, FOE/I remain a 
pressing and controversial aspect of debates on human rights. FOE/I are often perceived 
as being threats to national security or to a state’s power or to the capacity of those 
                                                 
6
 Statement made by ASEAN Pparliamentarians at the ASEAN officials summit in February 2009 in 
Thailand 
7
 ICCPR, Art. 19 (3) provides for restrictions on the grounds of (i) respect for the rights and reputations of 
others and (ii) protection of national security or of public order, public health and morals. Article 20 
provides for restrictions on the grounds of war propaganda and ‘incitement of hatred’ speeches and 
writings. 
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who benefit from the silencing of dissent, stifling of criticism and blocking of public 
discussion. The restrictions were politically-based restrictions on FOE/I in many ASEAN 
states as such, provided that the states lack of understanding on norm and governance 
of FOE/I and claim over the ‘ASEAN way’. The ASEAN human rights mechanism has just 
been newly established so it may be still difficult to have FOE/I protected by ASEAN 
states. The UN mechanism has not reached to ASEAN more effectively due to lack of full 
membership to international human rights system. States may argue for constraints 
based on their sovereign political ideology and structure. States which do not support 
the ideals of democracy and human rights as individual rights often restrict FOE/I on the 
grounds of political, legal and judicial practices. In some states, such as  Singapore, 
Malaysia and Vietnam, the supposed cultural relativity of human rights, framed around 
the notion of  Asian Values, is typically used by states to justify restrictions on human 
freedom greater than those that would be tolerated in western nations. The practice of 
restriction depends heavily on political ideology and consequential decisions rather than 
on any ‘gap’ in domestic legal systems.   
 
There are two key challenges for the ASEAN states in  implementing FOE/I in 
ways that align them closer to international human rights standards. First, how can a 
norm of fundamental human rights, like FOE/I, be developed and commonly accepted 
by all ASEAN states in the process of regionalism of human rights in ASEAN. Second, how 
can ASEAN states come up with a common philosophical understanding of the nature of 
rights when they apply exceptions and how can ASEAN states legalize FOE/I over claims 
based on cultural relativity. 8  
 
ASEAN states may need to examine the norms and standards on FOE/I, in light of 
international and regional law and practice in implementing FOE/I. The thesis therefore 
provides analysis of problems and challenges to ASEAN and its member states that may 
                                                 
8
 Jerome J. Shestack. The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, in Human Rights: Concept and 
standards. Janusz Symonices, Eds. Ashgate Dartmouth.  pp.31-66 
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haveimplications for ASEAN’s regional quasi-judicial human rights mechanism to 
implement FOE/I to bring it closer to international norms and standards.  
1.3 Research objective 
The ultimate objective of this research is to add to the capacity of regional actors 
of all kinds concerned with human rights to develop a better process and a better 
understanding of how to build a consensus on norms and standards around freedom of 
expression and information for the ASEAN states. This objective will not result directly 
from what follows in the thesis but rather from the dissemination of the ideas and 
analyses in regional media and forums. 
 
The specific objectives of this research are:  
1. To identify restrictions on FOE/I in ASEAN nations compared with 
international human rights standards and benchmarks in other regions 
notably Europe.  
2. To analyse the situation in selected ASEAN states, where the ground of 
national security has been often used to restrict FOE/I, to assess the extent 
to which such restrictions are legitimate as per international legal principles. 
3. To analyze and discuss the extent to which the ASEAN member states can 
legitimately impose restrictions as per international human rights standards.  
4. To identify factors that may have an impact on the practice at regional and 
state level which can strengthen the ASEAN human rights system. 
1.4 Research questions 
Although FOE/I are internationally recognised as human rights, they have not 
been coherently implemented in many ASEAN States. As already noted, there are clear 
reasons why states restrict these freedoms. The reasons might be rooted in states’ 
political, ideological, and structural differences but, in many cases, it is because of lack 
of common interpretation and dialogues to achieve consensus on minimum accepted 
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standards. The main research question, admittedly,  is why freedom of expression and 
information cannot be protected as constitutional rights in ASEAN states.  
Specific research questions are:  
 Are there laws in place at the state level regarding FOE/I?  
 If so, what could be  legitimate restrictions on the grounds of national security?  
 Why has FOE/I not gone further in ASEAN?  
 What are the challenges for states to comply with international standards on FOE/I? 
 What can ASEAN do to align FOE/I practice to be closer to international standards? 
1.5 Research scope 
The study focuses on standards and practices of restrictions on FOE/I on the 
grounds of national security or national interest as used by lawmakers in ASEAN states. 
The study deploys a legal approach in reading international human rights law, focusing 
particularly on Article 19 of ICCPR with regard to freedom of expression and other 
related domestic laws on FOE/I together with case law. By reviewing  laws and practices  
on restrictions on FOE/I  in several ASEAN member states, the notion of a state’s ‘margin 
of appreciation’ and principles of ‘provided by law’ and ‘necessary’ will be tested to 
challenge states which tend to broaden the scope of Article 19 (3) of ICCPR. The thesis 
then re-examines the philosophical, political ideals and moral justifications that states 
often use to justify restrictions of freedom of expression against norms and legal 
interpretations as per Article 19 (3) and Article 20 of ICCPR.  
 
Four of the 10 ASEAN states, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, were 
chosen as case studies. These countries represent different models and status of 
democracy. Indonesia represents  liberal democracy after its transition from 
dictatorship. Singapore represents the case of an  ‘authoritarian withholding democracy’ 
and a view of human rights based on the Confucian value of collectivity and the notion 
of Asian Values (more definition and description of this idea will be presented in the 
following chapters). Thailand is transforming to political pluralism and liberal democracy 
but still under a constitutional monarchy. Vietnam still holds to a  Marxist-Leninist 
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political ideology with regard to human rights and democracy. The review of practices of 
these four states may provide a clearer understanding of how states perceive and 
practice restrictions on freedom of expression and information and the challenges for 
ASEAN in getting states to agree on a commonly accepted norm. 
1.6 Significance of research 
Regionalism of human rights in ASEAN includes the process of establishing 
human rights mechanisms. ASEAN needs to identify a common understanding and 
acceptance of minimum standards to strengthen the regional human rights system. In 
particular, ASEAN is taking steps to support the constitutionalisation of human rights, 
typified by the draft Human Rights Declaration, which recognizes the controversial 
nature of freedom of expression in regional constitution-building and how this  will 
contribute to the norm-setting process for ASEAN.  In particular, the empirical approach 
in the review of laws and practices regarding restrictions of FOE/I on  grounds of 
national security will provide examples of practice and reasons why states are not yet 
protecting FOE/I as codified in Article 19 of ICCPR. 
 
The process of regionalism and especially during the on-going drafting of an 
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration have attracted the author as it will enhance her 
capacity to take part in the setting of human rights norms in ASEAN nations based on a 
clear understanding of regional particularities and values, in particular with regard to 
FOE/I and especially the extent to which member states of ASEAN can legitimately pose 
restrictions on FOE/I.  
1.7 Research method 
 
The thesis applies the sociology of law by examining international human rights 
instruments, domestic constitutions and law in practice around restrictions on FOE/I on 
grounds of national security, national interest and public order in the ASEAN context.  
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The study is also based on a review of scholarly debate on the subject matter, 
including legal interpretation based on case law, cultural relativity and Asian values, the 
current Universal Periodical Reports of the concerned states (UPR), and reports of the 
Special Rapporteur of freedom of expression. The other major source is cases that were 
brought to the Human Rights Council (HRC) and some prominent domestic cases of 
ASEAN states which can be analysed for the purpose of interpretation of such limitation. 
State responses to these cases in respective UPR and other domestic media coverage 
are referred to while there is limitation on accessing case documents from judicial 
sector because some countries do not allow public access to case documents. In 
addition to literature review, interviews were held with a small number of regional 
human rights advocates and national representatives to ASEAN inter-governmental 
commission to get more view on FOE/I. 
1.8 Thesis structure 
This first chapter laid out the background, goals, research questions and 
methodology of the study. Chapter 2 introduces basic concepts and understandings 
related to FOE/I and the ground of national security as defined under international 
human rights law. Text and case law are cited and analyzed to strengthen these 
understandings. Chapter 3 reviews the state of practice and situations regarding limiting 
freedom of expression on the grounds of national security in a number of ASEAN 
countries including Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. This is achieved by 
reviewing legal grounds for FOE/I and its limitation on the ground of national security. 
Reasons why many ASEAN member states justify limitations are adduced. Broadly 
speaking they include political, moral, and legal grounds and, in some cases, the 
evocation of the Asian values discourse to broaden the scope of restriction to 
supposedly protect a state’s security with the intended or unintended purpose of 
undermining individual freedom. Chapter 3 thus responds to the question as to why 
FOE/I in ASEAN has not aligned more closely with international human rights standards. 
Chapter 4 addresses challenges and factors that may drive the evolving acceptance of 
FOE/I in ASEAN. The increasing but gradual development of regionalism in ASEAN is the 
-13- 
broad driving factor for the human rights mechanism. Consideration of experiences of 
European regionalism and European systems of human rights benchmarks may provide 
implications for ASEAN. Chapter 5 concludes the thesis by arguing for possible ways in 
which ASEAN states might move towards greater acceptance and accelerate the 
implementation of coherent principles in practicing freedom of expression in the 
process of strengthening ASEAN human rights mechanisms.  
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CHAPTER 2  
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND 
INFORMATION AND THE RESTRICTIVE 
GROUNDS   
 
 
This chapter discusses basic concepts and understandings on FOE/I as human rights and 
their limitations on the ground of national security. Norms and standards for FOE/I, 
including legitimate grounds for restricting FOE/I, are adduced from international 
human rights law (notably Article 19 of ICCPR) and the Human Rights Council’s 
interpretations. Analysis of text, examples of cases in the UPR and other case law  are 
used for the purpose of clearer interpretation of FOE/I. Law and practice of the 
European human rights system with regard to implementation of FOE/I are also referred 
to in regard to how FOE/I became more accepted as universal human rights. The 
chapter aims to imply that regional norm building in ASEAN could be aligned with 
international human rights standards.  
2.1 Freedom of expression as a legal human rights norm   
 
Under international human rights law, 9 freedom of expression is clearly stated in 
Article 19 of UDHR: ”Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers….”.  
 
Article 19 of ICCPR embodies the same meaning as UDHR. Article 19 (1) protects the 
right to freedom of opinion without interference and does not permit any restrictions to 
                                                 
9
 Refering to 1946 UDHR and 1966 Two Bills of Rights (ICCPR and ICESCR) 
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be imposed on the right to hold an opinion. 10 The national security ground has no 
relevance as a defense against violation of Article 19 of ICCPR. The same provision 
expresses the broad scope of application of Art. 19 (2) as ‘without interference’ and 
applied to “ideas of all kinds” including information, facts, critical comments and ideas 
and opinions, news, commercial advertising, art works, political commentary etc which 
are protected.11 Article 19 (3) allows for certain restrictions on freedom of expression, 
including  ‘[r]espect [for] the rights of and reputations of others and ..[p]rotection of 
national security or of public order, public health and morals’. In many cases where 
government opponents were arrested or detained with criminal persecution because of 
their political opinions, the HRC found violations of Article 19 (1).   
Protection of national security is often cited as requiring prevention or response 
to serious threats to a nation. This extends the meaning of Article 20 to include war 
propaganda, national, racial and religious incitement. So Articles 19 (3) and 20 can be 
read together. And measures to protect public order or public safety overlap those 
concerned with national security.  
Other articles of ICCPR also permit restrictions of rights on the grounds of 
national security and thus parallel Article 19. 12 With regard to national security and 
other public order grounds, Article 14 (1) provides for the right to public hearings of 
criminal charges where the press and the public should not be excluded from the public 
hearing “for reasons of national security in a democratic society” except in certain 
strictly defined circumstances. 13 Articles 21 and 22 allow only those restrictions that are 
imposed by law and that are necessary “in a democratic society” in the interests of 
                                                 
10
 General Comments on article 19.  No.10. 19
th
 Session, para 1 
11
 Discussion was cited in Malferd Nowak. UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2
nd
 edition. N.P Engel 
Publisher. 2005.  
12
 ICCPR. Article 14 (1), fair and public hearing; Article 21, right of peaceful assembly; and Article 22, right 
to freedom of association which may be read together with Article 14 (fair and public hearing), Article 21 
(rights to peaceful assembly) and Article 22 (freedom of association). 
13
 General Comments on article 14 para. 6 
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national security and/or public safety. In several cases, the Committee found violations 
of these articles together with Article 19. 14 
 
2.2 Limitations of freedom of expression on the ground of national 
security 
Frequent issues and concerns arise around the scope of restrictions on FOE/I 
permissible understood as the two grounds of national security and public order. The 
HRC, in its General Comments on Article 19, expresses the view that any restrictions 
may not jeopardise the right itself. 15 Restrictions on FOE/I to protect national security 
are permissible but only in serious cases such as threat to the entire nation, 
dissemination of military secrets, calling for overthrow of a government with political 
unrest or propaganda of war within the meaning of Art. 20. 16  
 
Many governments, however, tend to apply this notion to justify restrictions on 
opposition groups, politicians and critical media. 17 However, the Committee found that 
criminal prosecution for subversive activities is a violation of Article 19. 18 Article 19 
means FOE/I encompasses oral transmission, print forms, writing or art and other form 
                                                 
14
 In case Le Lopez v. Uruguay, the alleged victim, a trade union organizer, was arrested and detained 
under “security measure” and charged with subversive association. The committee found violation of 
Articles 22, 19 (1) and 19 (2). 
15
 General Comments on article 19.  No.10. 19
th
 Session, para. 4. 
16
 Nowak. ibid. p. 355-464 .  
17
 In the case of Laptsevich v. Belarus and Dergachev v. Belarus, the Government of Belarus confiscated  
leflets and posters of political opponents on this ground but the Committee found violation of Art. 19. By 
limiting and fining print-outs of leaflet in as few  as 200 copies, the State has put obstacles to restrict the 
author’s freedom of expression and information as it is protected under Article 19. Laptsevich v. Belarus 
(no. 780/1997) and Dergachev v. Belarus (no. 921/2000).  Also in the case of Mukong  v. Cameroon, a 
journalist and writer opposed the one party system of Cameroon and advocated for multi-party 
democracy. He was arrested by the Government on the grounds of threat to national security and public 
order. 
18
 In several cases against South Korea, Park v. Republic of Korea, Kim v. Republic of Korea, and Kang v. 
Republic of Korea, Sohn  v. Republic of Korea, the ground of national security under the National Security 
law 1980 against threat of North Korean communists used by South Korea, the Committee found violation 
of Art. 19. 
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of media. All are regarded as being equally worthy of protection and no formould bear 
broader restrictions than the others. 19  
There are rules for permissible restrictions on FOE/I within the meaning of 
Article 19 (3) and Article. 20 of ICCPR. Such restrictions might be allowed under the 
following conditions: 
 
(i) Being ‘provided by law’. Meaning the state has to show the legal basis for such 
restriction. Human Rights Council (HRC) 20 required that restrictions must 
meet a strict test of justification. 21 In addition, HRC requires the state to 
provide details of the law and particular circumstance in which the law 
applies. Laws restricting the rights codified in international covenants must 
be compatible with the aims and objectives of such covenants. In case of a 
law which may be too broad in scope to be a justifiable restriction in itself, 
it may nevertheless be compatible with the Covenant. 22  
(ii) Being ‘necessary’: Meaning that the state shows evidence and need for a 
restrictive measure to protect national security and, if this is reasonable, it 
should be at the minimum necessary for that purpose. In this circumstance 
the Committee has tended to apply a more demanding criterion of 
democratic necessity. 23 Even though the Committee has not applied the 
proportionality test, it is understood that the requirement for being 
‘necessary’ includes a standard of proportionality. 24 
(iii) being ‘legitimate’ to the purpose: The criterion of’ legitimate aim’ is to 
determine whether some restrictions or limitations of rights are pursued for 
                                                 
19
 This view is expressed in the case of Ballantyne, Davison and McIntyre v. Canada (Communication No. 
385/1989; CCPR/C/47/D/385/1989) para 11.3  
20
 After replacing the Commission on Human Rights, the Human Rights Council decided to extend the 
mandate for another three years in its resolution 7/36 of March 2008. 
21
 No. 628/1995. CCPR/C/64/D/628/1995 Tae Hoon Park v. Republic of Korea para 10.3 states: “The right 
to freedom of expression is of paramount importance in any democratic society, and any restrictions to 
the exercise of this right must meet a strict test of justification” 
22
 Case Toonen v. Australia. No. 488/1992 View adopted 8 March 1994 is “ Even interference provided for 
by the law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims,  and objectives of the Covenant and should 
be, in any event, reasonable in the circumstance”  
23
 Nowak, pp 350. Also in the case of Mukong v. Cameroon. Also See Supra note 17 (cases against South 
Korean).  
24
 Elizabeth Evatt (1999)  in Secrecy and Liberty. Pp.89 
-18- 
a legitimate purpose, and thus permissible. In some cases the HRC took the 
view that restrictions by state parties were necessary for one of the 
legitimate aims set out in Article 19 (3). However, there are also cases that 
the Committee reviewed where the restriction of FOE/I was deemed to be 
permissible. 25 
 
In addition, the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of 
Expression and Access to Information (the Johannesburg Principles) 26 clearly state: 
“Mere publicity of activities that may threaten national security. Expression may not be 
prevented or punished merely because it transmits information issued by or about an 
organization that a Government has declared threatens national security or a related 
interest” (principle 8) and “expression may be punished as a threat to national security 
only if a government can demonstrate that: (a) the expression is intended to incite 
imminent violence; (b) it is likely to incite such violence; and (c) there is a direct and 
immediate connection between the expression and the likelihood or occurrence of such 
violence” (Principle 6).  
The case law and application of the Johannesburg Principles could be understood as:  
(i) Laws imposing restrictions or limitations must not be arbitrary or 
unreasonable and must not be used as a means of political censorship or 
of silencing criticism of public officials or public policies. 27 
                                                 
25 The case Handyside v. UK, the court ruled that freedom of expression may be limited for the sake of 
community’ morality. So noted that though having differences in political cultures and ideologies, the 
Western and Eastern have shown to share the same view. Other case ruled by ECHR was  conviction for 
attempting to re-establish a facist party of M.A v. Italy (Communication No. 117/1981 (21 September 
1981), U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/39/40) at 190 (1984) was permissible for restriction under art 19(3) 
because it meet the test of necessity for the purpose of interference.  
26
 The Johannesburg Principles was endorsed by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression in E/CN.4/1996/39 on 22 March 1996. In addition, the 
Special Rapporteur reiterated that any restriction to the right to freedom of expression on the grounds of 
protecting national security is only legitimate if the Government can demonstrate that the expression is 
intended to incite imminent violence, it is likely to incite such violence, and there is a direct and 
immediate connection between the expression and the likelihood or occurrence of such violence. Cf. 
A/HRC/17/27 dated 16 May 201. Para 36 
27
 Para 79 (f) 
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(ii) States may not extend the notion of state security so far as to penalize 
and suppress mere expression of opinion. 28 Although it is often seen that 
anti-state acts, or any preparations to topple a government may likely fall 
under criminal acts.29 
 
The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression (Special Rapporteur)30 reaffirmed that cases deemed 
justifiable under principles of permissible limitations and restrictions “must constitute 
an exception to the rule and must be kept to the minimum necessary to pursue the 
legitimate aim of safeguarding other human rights established in the Covenant or in 
other, international human rights instruments”. 31  
2.3 Freedom of expression and information in other regional human rights 
systems– the experience of Europe 
In order to establish benchmarking views and understandings for the analysis of 
ASEAN practices regarding freedom of expression and information practiced under 
international law, a brief review of European experiences on the same rights is now 
presented. In Europe, although FOE/I is rooted in legal tradition and democratic political 
culture, it is not surprising that Europe had gone through a paradox between 
                                                 
28
 This view is understood from several cases against Urugoay (no.8/1977 para. 16; no. 11/1977 para 17; 
no. 33/1978 para 12 and no. 44/1979 para 15). The HRC expresses that if a person is arrested or 
sentenced for prison for trade unions, political parties, journalism or other anti-regime activities is inter 
alia the violation of freedom of expression under art. 19.  This view is also seen in the case of Womah 
Mukong v. Cameroon, Communication No. 458/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (1994). 
29
 No. 458/1991 para 9.6 – 9.7 and U.N. Doc,CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991,10 August 1994. For instance, in 
the case of Adyayom et al. v. Togo, two university teachers and a civil servant had been detained and 
charged in 1985 with the offence of lèse-majesté because of their minor criticisms of the Togolese 
Government. The Commission on Human Rights observed that they may “criticize or openly and publicly 
evaluate their Governments without fear of interference or punishment within the limits set out by article 
19 paragraph 3”. Also  in case no.422-424/1990 and supra note. 17 (cases of South Korea). Many similar 
cases in the number of non-democratic African regime, the Committee considered that “the legitimate 
objective of safeguarding and indeed strengthening national unity under difficult political circumstances 
can not be achieved by attempting to muzzle advocacy of multi-party democracy, democratic tenets and 
human rights” 
30
 The Special Rapporteurs are part of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council. In 1993, the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights established the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression. 
31
 A/HCR/14/23 dated 20 April 2010. 14
th
 Session. Special Rapporteur report. Para 77 
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guaranteeing individual FOE/I as lawful rights and legitimate restrictions on the ground 
of  national security or nation’s interest. 32  
FOE/I are well recognised as a constitutional right by the Council of Europe 
because they were enshrined in international law. Although the Treaty of Europe does 
not mention specific rights it does recognise the principles of human rights under the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Such recognition results from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States. Community rights sometimes 
directly involve fundamental rights guaranteed in the Convention. 33 The European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) saw this standard as a general principle enshrined in Articles 8,9,10 
and 11 of ECHR to the effect that “no restrictions in the interests of national security of 
public safety shall be placed on the rights secured by above articles other than 
necessary for the protection of those interest in a democratic society’ . 34 
Article 10 of ECHR provides more scope for restrictions of FOE/I but at the same 
time stresses the three tests on ‘prescribed by law’; ‘legitimate aims’ and ‘what may be 
necessary in a democratic society’. It says:  “Everyone has the right to freedom. [The 
exercise of these freedoms carries duties and responsibilities] ... which may be subject 
to formality, conditions, restrictions as per prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society in the interest of national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health and morals, 
for the protection of reputation or rights of others...”  
Because Article 10 of ECHR is still general, the inherent feature and 
constitutional characteristics of FOE/I in this provision are made clearer by case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights. 35  
                                                 
32
 Mahoney and Early (ibid) in Secrecy and Liberty.  National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access 
to Information. Sandra Coliver, Paul Hoffman, Joan Fitzpatrick and Stephen Bowen (eds) Martinus Nijhoff 
Publisher. The Hague, Boston, London, Kluwer Law International 1999. p. 109 - 128 
33
 For instance, restrictions to workers from writings imposed by the Member States on the ground of 
public security could be ruled impermissible because it interferes with freedom of expression under ECHR. 
34
 cf.  Rutily v. Minister for the Interior (Case 36/75) ECR 1219 papa 32 
35
 Paul Mahoney and Lawence Early. Freedom of Expression and National Security: Judical and Policy 
Approaches under the European Convention on Human Rights and Other Council of Europe Instruments. 
In “Secrecy and Liberty. Sandra Coliver, Paul Hoffman, Joan Fitzpatrick and Stephen Bowen (eds) Martinus 
Nijhoff Publisher. The Hague, Boston, London, Kluwer Law International 1999 
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  The first principle, ‘prescribed by law’, means that any interference must have a 
basis in, or comply with, the law of the country. But this principle is together understood 
to include the structure that domestic law must itself be compatible with the minimum 
standards of the rule of law. Moreover, the issue in the quality of law is to ensure that 
there is no arbitrary interference on freedom of expression. 36 The principles of 
‘legitimate aim’ and ‘democratic necessity’ are also articulated in Article 10 of ECHR. 
However, under EU tradition, national security represents one of the legitimate grounds 
to justify restriction on FOE/I. On the other hand, it is noted that all European member 
states have to provide concrete measures being genuinely necessary for any restriction. 
These two principles could be both presented when there is a social need to apply 
legitimate aim to restrict freedom of expression. 37 
The doctrine of ‘margin of appreciation’ becomes a judicial self-restraint in the 
case of EU law and national law of EU member states. The trend in the EU is that the 
Convention increasingly requires member states to undertake measures to protect the 
fundamental FOE/I, including political speech. Press receives more freedom to hold the 
right and duty to comment on political matters and other public concerns as public hold 
the right to be informed. 38 
Looking at the law and practice of FOE/I, EU laws and the member states’ laws 
and practices show that FOE/I has evolved synchronously. The ECHR came into being in 
1953 but even after ratification by member states, violations were common. 39 At its 
beginning, the Council of Europe (COE) did not view FOE/I as absolute. FOE/I were 
viewed not from the viewpoint of individual rights but pertaining to community-
oriented value. Only in October 1993, at the Vienna Summit Conference, did Heads of 
State and Government of Member States of the COE reaffirm that “guaranteed freedom 
                                                 
36
 Ref. Sunday Time v. UK Judgment of April 26, 1979, Series A vol 30. Malone v. UK, Judgement of August 
2, 1984 Series A Vol 82, para 67; Huvig v. France Judgment of April 24, 1990 Series A vol 176-B para 26-29 
37
  Handy v. UK para 52. The applicant published obscene material, an anti-authoritarian handbook on 
living addressed to children and adolescence tended to deprave and corrupt’ its intended readers and was 
therefore criminal obscene. The judgment of December 7, 1976 vol 24,  the Strasbourg Court found no 
violation of ECHR art 10 on the ground of public morals. Although few case law on this principle but the 
Handy case was repeatly cited.  
38
 Case Sunday Time ibid. 
39
 Case Handy Side v. UK (1976); Malone v. UK (1984),  Lingen v. Austria (1986); Higvif v. France (1990); 
guardian v. UK (1991) 
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of expression and notably of media must remain decisive criteria for assessing any 
application for membership”. 40  
 
In sum, this review of European systems of human rights as well as its case law 
with regard to restriction of FOE/I has underlined some legal and structural issues of 
concern. National legislation contravenes the Covenant in ways that may be interpreted 
as permissible under the Covenant. This means that  constitutions and states’ laws 
might allow a broad scope of restrictions as well as a broader scope to justify such 
restrictions. There may be cases where the application of law may not be based on the 
same interpretation as international standards by means of domestic law. There are 
cases where legitimate tests of restrictions are not met by the judicial process at the 
state level. However state parties of ICCPR make reservation for joining Optional 
Protocol therefore it limits communication to be heard and taken by the HRC and for 
HRC to recommend corrective methods.  
 
Overall, ratifications to international human rights instruments may not 
guarantee that  FOE/I is protected, and that permissible restrictions must be under 
internationally accepted norms and standards. This encourages the present author to 
examine, in the next chapter, the state of practice in selected ASEAN states, so as to 
enable a better understanding of the law in practice in ASEAN states and why it is so. 
                                                 
40
 Vienna Summit, Final Declaration, 9 October 1993. 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/archives/other_texts/2-
vienna/declaration/declaration_vienna_summit_EN.asp 
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CHAPTER 3 
LAW AND PRACTICE OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION IN ASEAN  
 
This chapter provides an overview of ASEAN as a world sub-region in relation to 
its status in the international human rights arena. The chapter also outlines the state of 
practice regarding restrictions on FOE/I on the ground of national security in a number 
of ASEAN countries, namely Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The legal 
review of texts, and analysis of cases as applicable and where sources are available, 
enable conclusions as to whether or not such restrictions are legitimate by international 
human rights standards and in respect of domestic laws. The country case studies also 
provide situational justifications which states use to justify limitations on the ground of 
national security or other national interests. This helps explain why FOE/I in ASEAN has 
not so far generally conformed with international human rights standards. 
 
3.1 ASEAN and international  human rights instruments 
 
ASEAN states ratified the core human rights instruments at different stages and degrees 
of choice. Table 1 shows the ratification status of all 10 countries on the six core human 
rights instruments. It concisely shows differences in ideologies subscribed to, and 
choices made by, states on human rights. While CRC and CEDAW are ratified by all 
member states, ICCPR, IECSR, ICERD and CAT remained un-ratified by states such as 
Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore. Furthermore, not all state members have ratified the 
Optional Protocol of ICCPR allowing individual communications to the HRC.  
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Table 1 – Status of Ractification of ASEAN into core international human rights 
conventions  
State parties 
IC
C
P
R
 
IC
ES
C
R
 
C
ED
A
W
 
IC
ER
D
 
C
A
T 
C
R
C
 
Brunei x x 2006 X x 1996 
Cambodia  1992 1992 1992 1986 1992 1992 
Indonesia 2006 2006 1984 1999 1998 1990 
Lao PDR 2009 2007 1981 1974 X 1981 
Malaysia X x 1995 1995 X 1995 
Myanmar 1997 X 1997 x x 1991 
Philippines 1987 1976 1981 1969 1986 1990 
Singapore X x 1995 x x 1995 
Thailand 1996 1999 1985 2003 2007 2006 
Vietnam 1982 1982 1982 1982 x 1990 
 
The 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights opened up a new 
dimension in regional arrangements to secure human rights but also a strong argument 
for cultural relativism – i.e. Asian Values – as a qualifier to the validity of the universality 
of human rights from some ASEAN states. 171 UN member states adopted by consensus 
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action in agreed statement that: ‘... regional 
arrangements play a fundamental role in promoting and protecting human rights. They 
should reinforce universal human rights standards .... [t]he World Conference on Human 
Rights reiterates the need to consider the possibility of establishing regional and sub-
regional arrangements for the promotion and protection of human rights where they do 
not already exist’. 41 Controversially, some ASEAN states, notably Singapore, Malaysia 
and Vietnam embraced ‘Asian Values’. Hence, years later, ASEAN governments have not 
yet put forward ideas on the shape and substance of such mechanisms even shortly 
after the Conference, the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN states met and agreed that they 
should consider the establishment of an appropriate regional mechanism on human 
rights.  
                                                 
41
 National Assembly, 1993, Article I.37. 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en  
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  Since 2002, the concept of a regional human rights mechanism became clearer 
with the Roadmap for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, suggested by a Working 
Group to prepare for an ASEAN Human Rights Commission. The review from the 
Working Group indicated that, at that time, ASEAN was the only world region without a 
regional mechanism to monitor and protect human rights of citizens of member states. 
Therefore, the region was seen to be exposed to being monitored from sources outside 
the region. The Working Group thus urged the establishment of an ASEAN regional 
mechanism in order to better incorporate ASEAN perspectives and to complement 
international human rights standards in the region. 42  
 
The ASEAN Charter encodes human rights principles and  was formally discussed 
at the 11th ASEAN Summitin Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in December 2005. 43 Ten ASEAN 
leaders had the task of this draft charter. At the 12th ASEAN Summit, held in Cebu, 
Philippines in January 2007,  Cebu Declaration on Promoting the establishment of an 
ASEAN community block 2015 was adopted. One of the recommendations in this 
statement is the removal policy of not interfering with each other since ASEAN was 
founded in 1967. The Charter was adopted at the ASEAN Summit on 13 October 2007. 
The Charter represents a breakthrough in ASEAN to set goals, basic principles of 
human rights and commitment to build an ASEAN human rights body. Article 1 (7) of the 
Charter affirms that one of the objectives of ASEAN is "... to promote and protect human 
rights and fundamental freedoms."  For the first time in history, cooperation in human 
rights became an agreed principle of ASEAN member states and is now legally 
recognized with highest accepted value of ASEAN. 44 Beyond the Charter, the drafting of 
an ASEAN Human Rights Declaration is underway.  
 
                                                 
42
 Vivit Muntarbhorn. 2003 in ‘Roadmap for ASEAN Human Rights’ May 2003. 
43
 ASEAN Charter http://www.asean.org/21069.pdf  
44
 Article 2.2 (h, i) of ASEAN Charter notes: …adherence to the rule of law, good governance, the 
principles of democracy and constitutional government; …respect for fundamental freedoms, the 
promotion and protection of human rights, and the promotion of social justice; 
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3.2 State of practice in limiting freedom of expression in ASEAN  
  
FOE/I as part of ICCPR is the most difficult in getting a common sense and and 
the same  level of implementation in ASEAN. The reality is that many states restrict FOE/I 
at the state level by not accepting the same interpretations and principles outlined in 
Article 19 (3). 45 The codification of the FOE/I in UDHR and ICCPR and other regional 
human rights conventions like Europe proves to be itself a legal principle of universal 
validity.  However, equally important, the FOE/I should also be justified on moral and 
political grounds into domestic rule of law to be legitimate in practice. The following 
part examines states of practice on FOE/I notably Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, 
Vietnam to describe how the right is implemented domestically in some ASEAN states 
and how these states justified the imposed limitations on FOE/I. 
 
In general, among the ASEAN states, restrictions on FOE/I on the ground of 
national security is common despite differences in political ideology and adherence to 
democratic principles. In Indonesia and Thailand, the rise of FOE/I was recognized along 
with democracy in the early 1990s. However, with the financial crisis during 1997 and 
major leadership change in the early years of the 21st century, the protection of the 
freedom became fragile with much evidence of backsliding. Singapore and Malaysia 
learnt from Indonesia’s experiences and also systematically cracked down on reform 
movements. FOE/I have been tightly controlled in law and practice in Singapore, 
Vietnam and Myanmar by the one-party systems of those states. The Philippines has 
long established democratic institutions but this has had little impact on FOE/I. 
Cambodia established its supposed new democracy under the 1993 Constitution and 
signed various international human rights treaties but still retained strangleholds on 
                                                 
45
 Non of ASEAN states except the Philippines ratified the Optional Protocol of ICCPR 
45
 which allows cases 
and communications to be received by HRC and thus HRC can make concluding observations regarding 
issues which becomes the main sources of justifying a situation non-compliance.   
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basic freedoms and a electronic media, newspapers and  citizens’ freedom to talk about 
politics.46  
 
The recognition of FOE/I in the ICCPR, which some ASEAN member states have 
ratified, is one useful step but the battle is far from won. Since FOE/I is never absolute, 
and hardly defined as a rigid norm in ASEAN countries, the level of protection of, and 
restrictions on the right depends on a state’s political system, legal system and 
institutional guarantee at state level. Across South East Asia, FOE/I is increasingly under 
threat as governments seek to control media and individual views expressed via the 
internet, alternative media, and opposition organizations. 47 The Press Freedom Index 
(PFI) 48 shows ASEAN member states ranking very low over the years. 49 HRC’s General 
Comment on Article 19 (para 3) states: “Many reports of States parties confine 
themselves to mentioning that freedom of expression is guaranteed under the 
Constitution or the law. However, in order to know the precise regime of freedom of 
expression, in law and in practice, the Committee needs in addition pertinent 
information about the rules which either define the scope of freedom of expression or 
which set forth certain restrictions, as well as any other conditions which in practice 
affect the exercise of this right..”  
Indonesia 
Political settings 
Indonesia inherited not only laws but colonial institutions and a legal system with 
an essentially authoritarian character with long term and military leadership from the 
1960s to the 1990s. The consequence was centralisaton of power in state institutions 
                                                 
46
 Promoting Three Basic Freedoms – Towards Greater Freedom of Association Assembly and Expression 
in Asia. Elizabeth Nissan. Eds. 1999. The Three Freedom Project. www.Threefreedoms.org pp. 19 
47
 Views shared in press event on ’ Freedom of Expression - Rights Under Threat in Southeast Asia” at  the 
Foreign Correspondents Club of Thailand on September 14, 2011 
48
 The Press Freedom Index is an annual ranking of countries compiled and published by Reporters 
Without Borders based upon the organization's assessment of their press freedom records. 
www.freedomhouse.org.  
49
 Based on  PFI survey criteria, the 2011 survey shows that Thailand moved from Partly Free to Not Free 
of Press Zone while Cambodia,Vietnam and Lao remained on the lowest rank (respectively 165, 168 and 
171 out of 178 countries in survey in 2010). 
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and minimal participation from the broader society. The Soekarno government initially 
attempted to facilitate a pluralistic political life under the 1950 Provisional Constitution. 
This ceased in the period ofmilitary supression of Communists and other left-wing 
groups in the 1960s. In Indonesia, the regime of the first President, Soekarno, and the 
seizure of power by themilitary,  with the New Order initiated in October 1965, 
authorized the Command for Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib). Bresnan 
(1993:293) argued that the ensuing Indonesian political regime was a ‘managed 
pluralism’. 50 After the Suharto regime. Which ruled for 32 years until 1998, democracy 
took root and flourished as a pluralistic system through elections. Indonesia’s national 
motto “Unity in Diversity” received a surprising degree of consensus  
 
With increasing violations and abuse of fundamental human rights, including 
arrest, torture, and other violent acts by the military during the 1960s, the international 
call on human rights problems in Indonesia prompted critical responses from the 
government. First, the government attempted to counter accusations of human rights 
violations and rejected recommendations which they thought threatened the state’s 
independence and sovereignty. They argued that human rights values are not universal 
and sometimes human rights abuses helped to regulate diverse societies. Two journalists 
were killed there and several others received death threats, mainly for their reports on 
the environment. 51 Indonesia (117th of PFI ranking in 2010) cannot seem to pass under 
the symbolic bar separating the top 100 countries from the rest, despite remarkable 
media growth recently. 
 
Law, practice and justifications of restriction of FOE/I 
The 1945 Constitution Fourth Amendment, article 28J, states: “(1) Every person 
shall have the duty to respect the human rights of others in the orderly life of the 
community, nation and state …(2) … have the duty to accept the restrictions established 
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 Bresnan. J. (1993). Managing Indonesia: The modern Political Economy. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 1993 
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 Promoting Three Basic Freedom. Towards Greater Freedom of Association, Assembly and Expression in 
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based upon considerations of morality, religious values, security and public order in a 
democratic society”.  
The New Order reduced freedom of press through numerious security 
restrictions. 52 Restriction of political activities went hand in hand with repression of 
expression with no institution or judicial arbitrator was able to examine government 
conduct.  In December 1966, the new authority of Soeharto released the Press Law (No. 
11 of 1966) which required newspapers and publishers to obtain Publishing Permits. The 
tighter restriction was applied by the decree from Ministry of Information (No. 
3/Per/Menpen/1969). Though ‘disruption of public order’ is not defined in any 
legislation, criteria for banning of press included: opposing Pancasila (state ideology) 
and the 1945 Constitution; damaging people’s confidence in the national leadership; 
opposing state policy; endangering the unity of Indonesian society, nation and state.  
The period from 1966 until 1982 witnessed the arrests of hundreds of journalists 
and many newspapers being banned because they were alleged to criticize the 
government  in ways that damaged the national interest and impeded the maintenance 
of public order. Media and press suppression began with the banning of 46 out of 163 
newspapers by Kopkamtib after the October 1965 incident. 53  In 1982, two magazines, 
Topik and Fokus, were banned because they published articles about the President’s 
wealth.  
In 1982, Press Law 1966 was replaced by Law No. 21/1982 which regulated the 
new authority for publication permits in the Ministry of Information, instead of the 
military.  Article 4 of the Law states that there is no censorship of the national press but 
it allows guidance and supervision by the government to intervene in press matters. 
There was, however, often guidance to journalists from the state. The Indonesian 
Journalists’ Association was supposedly charged with protecting the interests of 
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 This term ‘Orde Baru’ is used when the former Indonesian President Suharto to characterize his regime 
as he came to power in 1966 
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 The incident on 1 October 1965 was when six army generals and an officer were kidnapped and killed 
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journalists and thus put pressure on editors. The victims in this period were the daily 
Sinar Harapan and  daily Prioritas that covered political matters to a greater degree than 
was permitted. In 1982, Sunardi, a lawyer was sentenced to jail for three years and four 
months because he sued President Soeharto for seizing power in 1965.  
During the 1990s, the Indonesian press expanded with growth of the internet 
and electronic media. The demand from the public for news coverage created 
competitions among the press. During the late 1990s, some press companies were 
acquired by state officials and military. 54 The increasing openness of the media 
industry, in line with interests of high state officials, came to be seen as challenging the 
state’s ‘security and order’. During 1994, alternative media grew, such as Suara 
Independent, Bergerak or Internet email list. Despite this, journalists continued to be in 
danger. Journalist C. Sukina of Ummat weekly was beaten by 20 security personnel and 
had his camera confiscated and film destroyed. On August 10, 1996, a lecturer at a 
private university in Yogyakarta, Central Java, was arrested by military personnel 
because he circulated information about the 27 July incident 55 that he obtained from 
the internet.  Recently, the anti-blasphemy law and the Criminal Code (sec. 156, 156A, 
310) have been used for suppression of expression of feelings of hostility against official 
religions. 56  
In sum, the transition since  President Habibie opened a new arena for the 
process of democratization in Indonesia, including new law on political parties and 
elections. Nevertheless the government retained Pancasila as state ideology and 
promoted the growth of media taking part in promoting democratic society. The 
Government remained worried about social unrest and imposed new law on 
demonstrations.57 Many of the State’s controls on FOE/I were lifted in practice when 
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President General Soeharto stepped down and ended the authoritarian regime in May 
1998. The economic crisis and protest against New Order made the new government of 
Baharuddin Joesoef Habibie unable to retain the same character of its predecessor and 
was pre-disposed to greater openness.   
Singapore 
Political settings 
 
On 16 September 1963, Singapore became part of Malaysia in a federation of 
Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak in 1962 to end British colonial rule. However, the 
union was short-lived after the 1964 race riots in Singapore. Being recognized to be a 
sovereign, independent state in 1963 with  UN admission opened the new face for 
Singapore to start a policy of neutrality in international relations, against threats from 
multiple sources including the communists and Indonesia with its Confrontation stance. 
The first Prime Minster of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, stressed three main concerns – 
national security, the economy, and social issues – during his post-independence 
administration. Mr. Lee then began to seek international recognition of Singapore's 
independence. Singapore joined the United Nations on 21 September 1965, and 
founded the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 8 August 1967 with four 
other South-East Asian countries. 
In the four decades after independence, Singapore transformed from being a 
developing country into being one of the most developed in Asia. The inspiring 
leadership during the separation from Malaysia saw the emergence of the notion of 
Singaporean “Exceptionalism” which refuted the idea that liberal democracy must 
automatically flow from economic prosperity. 58 Over the discourse on Asian Values in 
the international arena, Singapore developed the Shared Values thesis:  “the concept of 
government by honourable men (junzi) who have a duty to do right for the people, and 
who have the trust and respect of the population, fits us better than the Western idea 
that a government should be given as limited powers as possible, and should always be 
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treated with suspicion unless proven otherwise.”59  The People’s Action Party (PAP) as 
the ruling party, justifies this approach inthe concept of the junzi (a Confucian term 
referring to the ideal human), in which emphasis is placed on Asian values and moral 
legitimacy, in order to protect the economic stability of Singapore. 60 The PM, Lee Hsien 
Long, when he came into power in 2004, required the revisiting of the Confucian notion 
of governance wherein public policy and rule of law depend on executive discretion and 
remain sensitive to public debate, especially on democratic culture or popular demands 
on state policies. Such policy limited an effective participatory process including 
pervasive manner of state penetration of civil society.  
One of the reasons for Singapore’s lagging behind international human rights 
commitments is the upholding of Asian values and cultural relativism in human rights. 
Along with China and Malaysia and some other ASEAN countries like Vietnam, during 
the Vienna International Conference in 1993, Singapore strongly supported the concept 
of Asian Values and Confucianism. The key elements of Asian Values include respect for 
and trust in public authorities, social security and public order, harmony and collective 
commitments in all levels of society (Koh, 1993). 61 Asian Values in Singapore also 
include principles of community over self, upholding the family as the basic building 
block of society, consensus rather than conflict, and the maintenance of racial and 
religious harmony. Singaporean leaders remain strong in their upholding of national 
security by deploying the term of good governance. 62 Lee Kuan Yew in his ruling stated:  
"With few exceptions, democracy has not brought good government to new developing 
countries ... What Asians value may not necessarily be what Americans or Europeans 
value. Westerners value the freedoms and liberties of the individual. As an Asian of 
Chinese cultural background, my values are for a government which is honest, effective 
and efficient" (Lee Kuan Yew 1992). 63 It has been argued by Singapore leaders like Lee 
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Kuan Yew (Prime Minister from 1959 to 1990), Goh Chock Tong (Prime Minister from 
1990 to 2004) then Lee Hsien Long to the present that Singapore needs to adhere to 
Asian Values and the ideological model of “pragmatic democracy” as the core to 
maintaining its strong economic development and stability from which people can enjoy 
economic, social and educational benefits, and an orderly society, as a collective good. 
64 The notion of political opposition has been viewed as being contrary to the 
Singaporean notion of good government, as then PM Goh Chock Tong stressed the 
communitarian ideology. In this respect, the criticism of communitarian ideology is 
made that consensus building structure has its tension with the practice of international 
individual rights. 65 
 
Law, practice and justifications of restriction of FOE/I 
Singapore joins only two conventions, CEDAW and CRC, in six core international 
human rights conventions. However, together with Malaysia, Singapore reserves many 
other provisions for the reason that their domestic laws need to be to be supreme in 
effect over international law.  
Civil and political rights in Singapore are constrained by powerful legal and 
structural obstacles. The constitution in Article 14 (2) provides legal rights for freedom 
of speech, assembly and association. However, the constitution gives power to the 
Parliament, not the executive, to consider restrictions of those rights as necessary and 
expedient in the interest of the security of Singapore or its public order.  Related acts 
regulating FOE/I include the Criminal Code (section 505 - intent to make, publish or 
circulate any statement, rumor or report in written, electronic or other media that 
causes harm, fear or alarm to the public),  the Defamation Act (section 6-on slander); 
and the Undesirable Publication Act that put controls on media. In addition, the Internal 
Security Act (Article 20 – prohibition of printing, sales, etc. of documents and 
publications) gives authority to the Minister for censorship and responsibility for 
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printing presses and publications. The International Security Act (ISA), in force since 
colonial times, allows the Minister of Home Affairs to detain people who are considered 
as being menacing to national security without trial for up to two years.  
There is a structural obstacle to freedom of expression, especially in treatment 
by the press of political opinions. The News Paper Printing Act 1974 (NPPA) 66 and Public 
Entertainment and Meeting Act (PEMA) limit freedom of the press by prior censorship. 
Broadcasting is owned by the state. The Pubic Licensing Unit is an agency of the Police 
Department in the Ministry of Home Affairs. 67 Citizens fear to publicly express political 
opinions since they may be considered as an offence against national interests and 
social norms, and there is also fear of invisible surveillance of telephones or emails by 
the International Security Department (ISD). The Societies Act furthermore empowers 
the Registrar of Society to deny or withdraw a request for registration of a civil society 
organization on the grounds of it being a danger to public order or public security. 68  
Another structural obstacle lies in Singapore’s rule of law which is not focused on 
democracy, but is rather concerned to secure social stability. This stability is further 
secured through the prioritization of community interests and constructed 
Confucianism values. 69 Singapore’s judiciary has embraced a form of communitarian 
legalism, whereby the rights of the state trump those of the individual. Singapore’s 
courts have embraced cultural relativism, even if deviating from common law norms. 70 
The constitutional interpretation in Singapore now comes primarily “from within its own 
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four walls and not in the light of analogies drawn from other countries such as Great 
Britain, the United States of America or Australia.” 71  
 
Defamation laws are used to silence political opposition. Singapore’s judiciary 
feels there is a need to protect the government’s reputation and to defend stability and 
order, even if this means providing new grounds for executive power. In defamation 
cases, the courts must determine the balance between protecting free speech, and 
protecting the perceived integrity of Singapore’s leaders. 72 The leadership is called moral 
authority which is the cornerstone of effective government. 73 The current state of the law 
discourages the opposition from commenting on government policy whilst affording 
protection to the executive. 74 A recent case is Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic 
Party. Lee Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong sued the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), its 
secretary-general, Dr. Chee Soon Juan, and a member of its Central Executive Committee, 
Ms. Chee Siok Chin, for defamation in respect of two articles and a photograph concerning 
the NKF scandal 75 published in The New Democrat, the SDP’s newspaper. Another case 
related to the NKF scandal is Review Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong 76. The Court of 
Appeal, in a stunning interpretation of common law legitimacy in these jurisdictions, has 
demonstrated that there is a need to decide how to strike an appropriate balance between 
the “competing” interests of freedom of speech and protection of reputation in the context 
of local conditions but ruled that protection of reputation was not preferred over freedom 
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of speech. 77 This implies that the judiciary has normalized the PAP’s exceptionalist platform 
and has no intention of re-normalizing the regime of exception and how the exception can 
become the norm. It is also importantly noted that the judicial normalization of the 
government’s politics of communitarian legalism has created a statist and procedural 
rule of law that encourages defamation laws to quell political opposition. 78 With such 
an exceptionalist philosophy, Singaporean law may retain uncertainty and divergence 
over precedents from common law principles. 
The ideological justification for restricting freedom of expression as civil and 
individual rights can be viewed as political ideology in the context that Singapore after 
independence become a multicultural society, and thus has to maintain racial harmony 
through a “logics of groups”. This logic helps to govern and tighten a multicultural 
nation and ensure ethnic equality. Restrictive policies, as is often claimed to be the case 
in regard to Asian Values and other cultural arguments could be reformulated. The 
insistence on communitarian ideology with the colonial background can be also an 
explanation for the PAP-led government imposing pragmatic policies and ideas of non-
individualistic modernity regarding individual participation in political life. 79  
The challenge from within Singapore is changes in society. The social order, 
based on collectivist-oriented values and pragmatism has gradually transformed into 
weak loyalty and appreciation within the society. The court felt that “[p]roponents of 
change must produce evidence of a change in Singapore’s political, social and cultural 
values in order to satisfy the court that change is necessary … 80 There is increasing 
demand by young generations to live a Western life style, including demands for 
information and participation in public life, even engaging in political discussion. 
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Restrictions on FOE/I via printed forms of publication cannot accommodate the 
increasingly availability of cyberspace information channels.  Academic critics from 
within the State argue that under these conditions, the process of collective consensus-
building in Singapore can no longer work. 81  
 
Thailand 
Political settings 
Thailand underwent a transition from monarchy to monarchical democracy by 
means of recent constitutions. The values of monarchical loyalty do not support the 
concept of human rights. In the name of preserving potitical stability if there is a threat 
to the constitution, the King can intervene to grant or withhold legitimacy from rival 
contenders for power.82  
Thailand has a history of more than 20 governments and 17 constitutions since 
1932. The FOE/I situation has not been stable. In 1976, the military successfully took 
control of the country and installed the new government of Thanin Kraivixian, thus 
resulting in tighter controls on freedom of expression. This explains why national 
security concerns were the focus under the influence of military over the government 
from 1940 to the 1970s. Then, during the 1980s, anti-communism in Thailand led to 
hostility and tension and consequent concern to oppress the voice of the people 
demanding justice on the ground of communism. It wasseen as threat to national 
security. The Constitution of 1997, with its major changes, marked an important step in 
the advancement of human rights. It paved the way for political reform to make the 
government more accountable to the public and created new institutions such as 
administrative courts, an Ombudsman, and national bodies to promote and protect 
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human rights. However, after 1997, under Thaksin’s regime, the human rights 
commission has been limited in its power and authority.  The current 2007 Constitution 
still upholds all fundamental rights (such as civil rights, political rights of individuals and 
especially rights of communities to participate in resource management and public 
work). This Constitution specifically empowers more legislation for national institutions 
on human rights to handle the violation of human rights, including the right to 
investigate and take forward the results investigations to court hearings. 83 
The Thai Government has gradually moved to uphold human rights values in the 
political and social sphere. The concept of human rights in Thailand emerged 
dramatically in the social movements of the democratization process in the 1990s. 
Initially, Thai authorities discouraged a notion of human rights based on  Western values
. Instead, they promoted the social values of Buddhism of love, compassion and royalty 
and ‘elements of Thai-ness’ as opposed to liberal human rights. Moral ideology was 
emphasized with respect for the king and interests of the community being priorised. 
Thus Thai governments have not responded to the universality of human rights as the 
UDHR with common values as such.84 Civil society is also limited to not spreading any 
views or undertaking actions contrary to the elements of Thai-ness. 85  
 Changes in the governing regime over recent years in Thailand has led to a 
decline in the practice of FOE/I and Thailand’sranking on the Press Freedom Index 
slipped from153rd to 178th in 2010 and fell back into the Not Free Press country in 2011. 
86 On-going political violence caused this drop in Press Freedom Index ranking. For 
example, two journalists were killed and some 15 wounded while covering the army 
crackdown on the “red shirts” movement in Bangkok in 2010.  
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Law, practice and justifications of restriction of FOE/I 
The 2007 Constitution legitimated  FOE/I as liberal rights (Section 28). Right to 
information is established in Section 56.  87 Exceptions, especially on grounds of security 
of state and public order, are stated in section 45 
1. A person shall enjoy the liberty to express his or her opinion, make speeches, 
write, print, publicise, and make expression by other means. 
2. The restriction on the liberty under paragraph one shall not be imposed 
except by virtue of the provisions of the law specifically enacted for the 
purpose of maintaining the security of the State… 
3. The closure of a newspaper or other mass media business in deprivation of 
the liberty under this section shall not be made…. 
4. The censorship by a competent official of news or articles before their 
publication in a newspaper or other mass media shall not be made except 
during the time when the country is in a state of war;…. except by virtue of 
the law enacted under paragraph two. 
 
The 2007 Constitution stressed the role of radio and television broadcasting and 
telecommunications as national resources in the public interest but the liberty of 
expression is carried with duty. Section 47 of Constitution says that:  “In carrying out the 
act under paragraph two, regard shall be had to optimal benefits of the people at 
national and local levels in education, culture, state security, other public interests and 
free and fair competition, provided that public participation in the operation of public 
mass media shall also be encouraged”.  
Restrictions on the right to freedom of opinion and expression in Thailand are 
specifically regulated, mainly through the Emergency Decree, lèse-majesté law (in 
particular article 112 of the Penal Code), and Computer-related Crimes Act of 2007.  
 The Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation, BE 2548 
(2005), states the need to prohibit assembly and freedom of expression under a "state 
of emergency", understood as a situation that affects or may affect the public order of 
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the people or endangers the security of the State, or may cause the country or any part 
of the country to fall into a state of difficulty, or contains an offense relating to terrorism 
under the Penal Code. Moreover, a war is to be controlled under the power of the Prime 
Minister to “preserve the democratic regime … the interests of the nation public order, 
… terrorism” and other grounds. 88  
FOE/I is also often viewed as being contrary to the notion of public morals, 
defined under lèse-majesté law when the government might use this reason to suppress 
the liberty of individuals to share opinions through different means of communication 
such as websites. So far, about 10,000 websites have blocked on the grounds of national 
security and breaches of lèse-majesté law. 89  
The case of the shutdown of online newspaper Prachatai on 8 April 2010, by 
order of Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban, is a prominent example of how the 
Thai Government applies such law. 90 In addition, with the claim of protecting national 
security, 35 other websites, supportive of the United Front for Democracy Against 
Dictatorship (UDD) , were also reportedly shut down.   
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In sum, Thailand was heading towards a more open, pluralistic polity by rule of 
law suggesting thatthe law would not allow people to interpret the laws too liberally 
and abuse them. 91 The Government confirmed that as a democratic country Thailand 
values equality and freedom, particularly freedom of expression. However, it is 
universally recognized that freedom of expression has limits and comes with certain 
responsibilities, but that such limitations must be put in place by law. As such, freedom 
of expression does not allow a person to verbally attack, insult or defame anyone, not to 
mention the Head of State. Lèse-majesté law in Thailand is not aimed at restricting the 
legitimate right to freedom of expression but for “the will of the majority of Thai people, 
Thai society, ethics and culture as a whole”. 92 
 
Vietnam 
Political settings 
Vietnam was a long time governed by feudalism and then, for a brief period, was 
a French colony until the August Revolution in 1945. The first Constitution in 1946 gave 
birth to a new republic and democratic nation.  However, in three decades of war after 
the new nation was formed, until 1975, Vietnam was led by the Communist Party in 
light of Marxist-Leninist ideology in all fields of socio-political life, economics and 
governance system. The 1980 Constitution formally brought Vietnam into being as 
socialist state. Since then, it has remained an authoritarian state under a one party 
system with a state-centric and centralised democracy model.  
In Vietnam, the understanding of human rights is complex, bound up as it is in 
culturally contested political positions.93 The concept of human rights has been heavily 
influenced by the Chinese-political-moral system, under which Confucian values 
stressed social duties, hierarchies and obligations. French colonial legalism imported 
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Western rights-based law and political morality into Vietnam. Even Ho Chi Minh – the 
leader of the August Revolution - incorporated human rights into the 1946 Constitution. 
Later on, Communist party leaders raised to pre-eminence Marxist-Leninist principles of 
socialist ideals together with Confucian ideals about power and rule.  The 1982 
Constitution reaffirmed the Marxist Leninist ideology in Article 4: “the Vietnamese 
Communist Party, acting upon the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and Ho Chi Minh thought, is 
the force leading the State and society”. After Doi Moi in 1986, and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the nation shifted radically to an ‘open door’ policy and integration with 
the wider world and hence the state engaged more in human rights discourses. Vietnam 
also acceded to UN human rights instruments (ICCPR, IECSCR) in 1982, but overall the 
western idea of human rights is still controversial in Vietnam. “Doi Moi” and the 
subsequent evolution of a socialist-oriented, market economy required legal reform to 
ensure that human rights are not only framed in moral and nationalistic terms, but as 
part of the rule of law. 94 However, until the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, Vietnam joined 
Singapore and others in upholding the principle of ‘non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states’ and highlighting the ‘significance of national and regional particularities 
and various historical, cultural and religious background’.  
At present, Vietnam is still ranked low with regard to Freedom of Press and 
Access to information. According to the survey of Global Integrity in 2006, 95 civil society 
and media ranked 28 (i.e. very weak) and public access to information received a score 
of only 5.  On the Press Freedom Index, in 2010 Vietnam ranked 165th among 178 
countries in survey with a score of 75.5). 96 According to the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), Vietnamhas the world’s fastest rate of internet take-
up. 97 Whilst this is a positive sign with respect to the implementation of FOE/I it is also 
seen as a potential   threat to government.  
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Law, practice and justifications for restrictingFOE/I 
FOE/I are considered constitutional rights but have been given little effect due to 
the enormous discretionary power of government. The 1992 constitution guarantees 
freedom of expression. Article 69 states: “Citizens are entitled to freedom of speech and 
freedom of press; they have the right to receive information and the right of assembly, 
association and demonstration in accordance with the law”. Based on the Constitution, 
the Party indicated a rule of law reform but this has had little visible effect in defining  
restrictions on freedom of expression and state practice. Domestic laws, including Press 
Law, Anti-Corruption Law and Law on Complaint and Denunciation (and the upcoming 
Law on Information Access) have been established to regulate FOE/I. However, there 
are other laws, such as the Penal Code, that restricts FOE/I on the ground of national 
security. 98  
The first prominent case involved two journalists  publically expressing opinions 
and demanding information in a corruption case of PMU 18 regarding Mr. Bui Tien 
Dung, the then PMU18-chief of the government-run construction project. During their 
search for truth, journalist Chien of the Thanh Nien Newspaper and journalist Nguyen 
Van Hai of Tuoi Tre newspaper, were convicted for ‘abuse of power’ under Art. 281 of 
the Penal Code. 99 This case obviously shows that public and media were demanding 
information on public officials’ duties. But instead of being able to access such 
information, the journalists were restricted in their freedom as members of the press 
and received criminal convictions.  
The second case concerns a Father Ly and a Mr Vi Hoi who were founding 
members of Bloc 8406, which in April 2006 launched an on-line petition signed by 118 
democracy activists calling for peaceful political change and respect for human rights in  
Vietnam. On March 30th 2007, dissident Catholic Priest Thadeus Nguyen Van Ly was 
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sentenced to eight years imprisonment and the court found him guilty of "extremely 
serious violations against national security" and "having distributed materials intended 
to undermine the government". Mr Vi Duc Hoi 100 was charged for defaming the 
‘physical and psychological integrity’ of the State under the Penal Code. The Court 
interpreted peaceful expression of political opinions as likely to precipitate violence and 
was thus a threat to national security. This understanding was nevertheless the same as 
the international standards. 101 
This case law shows that the scope of criminal offences on the ground of 
national security is somehow extended solely by government interpretation. The 
offences of defamation and dissemination of false information against the government, 
press opinion and demand for information on duties of public officials or political views 
etc. are criminalized on the ground of harming national security or national interests. 102  
There are structural challenges for the judiciary in protecting FOE/I in practice. 
Although since the revised Criminal Code (1985) and Criminal Procedure Code (1989), 
the state provides guarantees of presumption of innocence, the provisions of the 
current laws still allow the state to apply double standards compared with what they 
have acceded to in the ICCPR. 103. However, under the guidance of the party using an 
argument of political morality, the Court has less scope for reading these provisions 
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consistently with international human rights treaties. 104 In practice, political trials still 
happen on the ground of maintaining peaceful order and protecting the rule of 
socialism. 105 So FOE/I are still restricted on the grounds of national security and political 
stability with the burden of proof not resting with the burden of proving of the State.106 
In addition to criminalization of offences on the ground of national security, the 
state has tightened media freedom via censorship and targeting control over journalists. 
Recently, the press has been even more strictly controlled. 107 700 news outlets in 
Vietnam are state-controlled. 108  Banning media, publication or use of the internet for 
communication in the name of state security and social order has been increasing and 
includes limiting access to to social media sites like Facebook .  Newspapers can receive 
administrative fines in cases where they have provided information contrary to the 
control of the State. 109 Government bans the use of the internet for sharing information 
related to state secrecy, military secrecy or defamation and hacking. 110 With the growth 
of the internet and bloggers, the State has also put in place stricter regulations. 111 The 
control of information and limits on the participation of citizens in decision-making have 
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become more common. 112 Recently, over 30 individuals reportedly remain imprisoned, 
including members of banned political groups, independent trade unionists, bloggers, 
journalists and writers. By August 2011, a blogger and a poet were freed under amnesty, 
but 17 bloggers and three journalists were still held. 113 Regarding limitations on media 
and other forms of expression, the HR Committee was concerned at reports of extensive 
limitations on the right to freedom of expression in the media and the fact that the 
Press Law does not allow the existence of privately owned media. It recommended Viet 
Nam put an end to restrictions on freedom of expression and that press law should be 
re-formulated in compliance with article 19 of the ICCPR. 114 
The state justifies these various restrictions on grounds of protecting national 
security, ethical values, national traditions and customs. Vietnam has stepped up in 
implementing the rule of law, but the justifications for such restrictions are mainly from 
political ideology and political decision making115. Dissidents expressing opposing 
political opinions are regarded as being harmful to the rights of other people and to 
peace and security and the general development of society. 116 
In sum, even though Vietnam committed, in ratifying ICCPR, to follow 
international human rights standards,  restrictions on FOE/I in Vietnam are often based 
on defamation or dissemination of wrongful information against government policies or 
government officials, expression political opinions. The means of restrictions can be 
criminalisation of offences or prior censorship of media and press.  The practice of 
restriction remains in the interpretation of law by the state’s judicial system. The 
challenge for FOE/I is placed on political idea on the concept of FOE/I in relation to the 
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meaning of democratic society as well as the withdrawing away from the double 
standards system in law.  
 
 Chapter Conclusion  
FOE/I are universal human rights. Although many ASEAN states have ratified the 
ICCPR and have thus committed to protecting these rights, implementation at the state 
level is varied and uncertain due to the omnipresence of the political sphere. In all four 
country case studies, their Constitutions provide the legal basis for FOE/I. The states 
often, however, establish other laws and regulations to restrict those rights. The rule of 
law is challenged under the guise of political morality and is thus little in the hands of 
the judiciary. With their common history of post-colonialization and authoritarian 
governance, ASEAN states still uphold the Asian way or ASEAN values. Bystressing the 
risk of political instability discourages leaders from being more open to FOE/I when the 
exercise of these rights arguably results in defamation, and religious or political 
opposition contrary to the matter of  national security.  Given the widespread tightening 
of freedoms in many ASEAN states, The special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression 
stresses: “The right to freedom of opinion is absolute and may not be limited in any way, 
whereas the right to freedom is not absolute and may thus be subject to exceptional 
restrictions and limitations as defined in article 19, paragraph 3, and article 20 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Such restrictions and limitations 
must be interpreted in accordance with international human rights law and the 
principles deriving there from”. 117 
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CHAPTER 4 
ASEAN: CHALLENGES FOR FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION AND INFORMATION 
 
This chapter identifies challenges and factors that may drive the evolving acceptance of 
human rights in ASEAN, specifically FOE/I, at both regional and state levels. As ASEAN is 
moving more rapidly to establish regionalism, a key consideration will be building a 
higher level of consensus on strengthening of a sub-regional human rights mechanism. 
Experiences of European regionalism and the evolution of a European system of human 
rights as discussed in this chapter may be useful to provide bench marking for ASEAN in 
the future. 
a) Asian values and other moral ideologies  
Asian values and other moral ideologies remain arguments against the practice 
of human rights.  “Asian values”, in particular, is still a strong argument for Asian 
exceptionalism against universalism featured prominently in the 1993 UN Vienna 
Declaration process. Developing states of ASEAN often appraise national interest or 
claim that there are regional particularities with different historical, cultural and 
religious backgrounds other than the Western values on universality of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. 118 Despite the ongoing discourse internationally and even 
amongst ASEAN countries there is no clear definition of Asian values.119 Generally, 
Asian values are defined as including harmony, consensus and collectivity. Asian values 
represent an absence of individualism and a social contract that underpins a 
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communitarian concept of societies (Koh, 1993). Key features of Asian values thus 
include the primacy of community over individual rights, authority, social harmony and 
stability.  
Other distinctive features of Asian cultures that are pitted against ideas of 
human rights and democracy are notably Confucian-style values which include respect 
for personalized authority, a dominant political party and a strong state (Neher and 
Marlay, 1995). But many scholars reject these ideas. 120  
Asian values and moralitiesare still often used as objections to international 
human rights standards. The rise of the Asian values debate in human rights discourse 
was the consequence of a misunderstanding of the so-called western formulation of 
human rights. It was, in contrast, proposed by some ASEAN governments as a means of 
shirking their duty and respect for human rights. By Asian values, ASEAN state leaders 
often put collective interests over individual rights, giving priority to economic 
development and political stability over the political rights. 121  
The claim of Asian values is argued by some to override the ‘rule of law’ for 
permissible restriction on human rights in context (Kingsburry, 2008). 122 Although Asian 
values can be recognized, they are not necessarily sufficient to justify claims for absolute 
restrictions on human rights. The need for a common norm over the debate on the 
Asian values is expressed in the Bangkok Declaration which notes that: " while human 
rights are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and 
evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of 
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds".  
 
b) Cultural relativism and Asian exceptionalism 
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ASEAN includes a diversity in cultural and socio-political systems amongst 
member states.  ASEAN states display varying levels of economic development, cultural 
diversity, political and democratic settings. These differences underpindifferences in 
interpretations and practices of human rights compared to international human rights 
norms. It is also a common view that a regional human rights mechanism cannot easily 
encompass the entire range of diversity among states within the region in terms of 
historical background, cultures and traditions, religions and levels of economic and 
political development.123 Claims to relativism of rights continue in the ASEAN States 
while cultural relativisim opens a door for not just differences but also for persecution  
rationalised – to explain the special circumstances of particular cases.  
In South East Asia, there is tension between rights and legitimacy and between 
rights and public goods. Legitimacy of rights and laws remains as political unity, the 
power held by authorities on one hand, as the reason upon which the nation intends to 
secure and preserve its national interest on the other hand. Following Weber’s theory 
of legitimacy of rule, thetest of rational belief needs to be applied to moral values and 
the extent to which their legality is accepted by soceity. This is so called Asian 
Exceptionalism or the Asian way on which leaders of ASEAN states argue to protect 
their nations. Here again, the often seen claims of Asian Values on which many ASEAN 
leaders, including Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad, Indonesia’s 
Soharto and other like authoritarian leaders, relates to the sense of community and 
collectivity over individual civil and political rights, and thus rejects the universality of 
rights.  
c) Notion of sovereignty  
The notion of sovereignty was enshrined in ASEAN to define human rights as 
the subject of state internal affairs. In political and international relations, the notion of 
state sovereignty is underlined in the aim and purpose of ASEAN in its Charter. Member 
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states are deemed to give priority to prosperity, peace and security. Human rights, 
democracy and rule of law come after in priority. And since the principle of non-
intervention in internal affairs is upheld, human rights still remain as state matters. 
d) Institutional challenges 
The lack of an effective regional human rights mechanism in ASEAN must be 
highlighted. Efforts to strengthen an ASEAN human rights mechanism have met moral 
obstacles from debates on universalism versus relativism of human rights and the 
question of what human rights norms non-western states should adopt.  The ASEAN 
human rights roadmap, ASEAN inter-governmental human rights commission (AICHR), 
was established in 2009 to promote and protect human rights in light of international 
human rights instrument. 124 However, this commission is very new and there is yet no 
jurisdiction to handle human rights violations of member states. So the protection of 
rights will first depend on national legislation and domestic jurisdictions. Although 
ASEAN has set a goal of "an identity" (Article 35 of the Charter), the dialogue between 
states oncommon interests and a minimum standard for any human rights mechanism 
for the region is  ongoing.  
The continuing and increasingtrend to restrict human rights in ASEAN place 
challenges before the ASEAN Human Rights mechanism and raises a need for the 
nations to reconcile differences in legal and judicial systems and norms with the 
international human rights standards.  
e) Structural challenges  
Even though consensus building is  a principle for ASEAN, it is not yet clear how 
consensus mechanisms work within traditional political cultures and institutions of 
ASEAN member states (Medina , 1999). 125 Moreover,  the range of issues on which 
concensus might be sought is wide. The universal human rights, as Donnelly argued, 
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should be properly understood and norm-setting must account for national interests, 
national security and cultural particularity and should be built on a common dialogue 
(Donnelly 2003, Chan, 1999). 126 There is also room for states which have a ‘thin’ 
democracy to learn from others of ‘thick’ democracy culture under the implications of 
rapid development of globalization, interconnected communication of media and 
growth of dissenting non-state voices and civil society in the region. 
 
Ahead, there are challenges for governments to be able to achieve consensus on 
common norms within different political ideologies and standards to adjust their rules 
of law to protect FOE/I in ASEAN at the regional level as analyzed below. 
 4.1 Challenges for FOE/I at regional level 
a) Absence of norms and standards for FOE/I  
With the idea of upraising collective and community interests, the exercise of 
fundamental human rights such as FOE/I becomes uncertain in ASEAN states because of 
the absence of norms and standards in implementing rights. The political culture of 
many member states still supports suppressing freedom of expression, not disclosing 
information and heavy press censorship for the sake of community morality and 
national security.  There is, of course, the paradox of the conceptions of freedom and 
law where law can pose some limitations on freedom but normatively only when such 
freedom restricts freedom of others.  
 
The norm setting process, as stressed in the ASEAN roadmap for a Human Rights 
Mechanism for “crafting of the norms/standards behind the establishment of an ASEAN 
Human Rights Mechanism” 127 needs to include the right ‘to’  freedom of speech and 
expression etc. as stated in Article 19 of ICCPR read together with restriction provisions 
in paragraph 3 of the same Article. As such, a common understanding and accepted 
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norms and mechanisms to protect and safeguard FOE/I are yet to be endorsed at 
regional level. 
b) Weakness in governance and mandate of regional human rights 
mechanism 
 Notions of sovereignty and non-interference remain obstacles for 
implementation of  human rights under international law because these denote the 
right of a nation state to enforce its own version of human rights (Moore and Pubantz, 
2002, p45-46). 128 So in the case where there is an absence of a supranational 
enforcement agency in international or regional human rights regimes, challenges can 
be coupled with the resistance of states for reasons of sovereignty which pose challenge 
for international law.  
 
With institutional constraints in the rule of law at the state level for protection of 
FOE/I, where domestic laws can impose limitations to freedom, and the rule of law itself 
normatively cannot  guarantee  freedom from arbitrary restrictions, it is challenging to 
have a powerful regional human rights mechanism that embodies  “respect for the 
principle of exhaustion of local remedies prior to access to the regional Commission in 
the framework of international law” with “power to monitor and investigate 
allegations”.129 
4.2 Challenges for FOE/I at the state level 
As a consequence of examining the situation and practice of FOE/I in several 
countries in Chapter 3, it is obvious that ASEAN is facing some critical challenges the 
practice of FOE/I.  
The first challenge lies in systems of political ideology and internal politics and 
models of democracy in relation to political stability within each state. The end of the 
Cold War and fall of the Berlin Wall and Leninism were the catalysts for transforming 
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world politics and also impacted in ASEAN. However, many states in the region still hold 
strongly to nationalism from decolonization by stressing centralization enforced by 
political and military dictatorship as in the Philippines during 1970s, Indonesia during 
the 1960s, Myanmar (to the present). Another form of political system is ‘technocratic 
authoritarianism’ as in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia after Suharto. In other ASEAN 
states, the fall of Leninism is still transformed into communism with some respect for 
the rule of law, as in Vietnam and Laos. Perhaps, while ASEAN will continue with 
significant political variations rather than a uniform political order, FOE/I will remain 
under the hand of state leaderships and prey to internal politics. Over the past 30 years, 
the ‘Asian values’ discourse has continued in Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam whose 
state leaders are most vocal in resisting individual human rights.  ‘Asian values’ thus 
directly influence the notion of FOE/I because governments fear that such freedoms 
may bring threats to the national security and political stability.  In practice, Singpore 
and Malaysia, under thisclaim, have put up Internal Security Acts that challenge  
individual liberty and the sense of law in applying effective judicial systems. States like 
Vietnam and Myanmar uphold strongly national security and political stability over  
freedom with zero tolerance manner, while states like Singapore and Malaysia set very 
restrictive laws on media and state security while contesting the concept of outlaw 
states. 130  
The ASEAN states uphold their authoritarian governance so that individual rights 
to FOE/I are often overridden in the community’s name. In other words, states can 
impose restrictions the FOE/I based on their political moralities and ideologies.131 This 
‘Asian Values’ discourse continues contrary to notions of FOE/I as liberal human rights 
codified in ICCPR where states have no obligation to interfere . Those states thus do not 
recognize rights of individuals on FOE/I, including the right to pursue communication 
with the human rights body. 132  
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The second challenge is the absence of legal positivism and rule of law. The case 
is that legal interpretation may depend on moral reasoning and purpose of law 
(Dworkin, 2002). 133 In the ASEAN states, it is often seen that law and morality are not 
seperated within the argument that a positive legal system which meets the values 
system can function with effect. Unlike Western politics, which is based on legalism, 
Asian politics is often based on reciprocity. But in terms of human rights, legalism may 
not yet function to protect human rights because it lacks internal morality. Thus the 
struggle to accept legalism for human rights in its fullest dimensions continues. 134 Based 
the practices identified in Chapter 3, the critical observation is that ASEAN States have 
not fully established effective legal and judicial systems to meet the three main tests of 
freedom of expression, namely: (i) provided by law; (ii) legitimate aim; and (iii) 
necessity/proportionality. Thus, justice, or a just society where liberties and rights are 
equal and secured, as contested by John Rawls, is still subject to political bargaining. 135  
The challenge for application of restrictions on FOE/I relates to how states see its 
legitimacy. 136 
The third challenge is the lack of participative democracy by which liberty on 
FOE/I should be protected with equal concern and respect by the states. 137 In ASEAN, 
over the past three decades, there has been an advance in democracy, but democracy 
remains fragile in different forms, such as ‘monarchical people democracy’ of Thailand, 
‘guided and pragmatic democracy’ of Singapore, ‘central democracy’ or semi-
authoritarian of Vietnam etc. States such as Thailand and Indonesia, with transformed 
but fragile democracies, gradually allow the growth of FOE/I but may still use other 
grounds for suppression such as religious harmony and lese majeste. In reality the 
participation of civil society and media in the public sphere is limited by legal and 
judicial constraints.  
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The fourth challenge remains participation of ASEAN states in international 
human rights instruments. 138 Not all ASEAN member states ratified the ICCPR, so that 
FOE/I is not fully recognized and protected by all ASEAN states. Although the ASEAN 
Charter promotes principles of human rights and justice, the Charter does not provide 
any specific provision for FOE/I or on what conditions such freedoms can be restricted. 
The Charter does not recognize any regional human rights convention as it is yet in 
place. This gives wide room for states to impose control and restrictions on FOE/I which 
range from preventing public from policy debates to strict censorship on media from 
many forms of social communication, criminalized sanctions of perpetrators for 
expressing different political opinions or government defamation and religious 
blasphemy. 
 
4.3 Driving factors for FOE/I in ASEAN 
  Despite challenges, human rights and FOE/I in ASEAN and its member states 
seem to have room to grow. There are factors that push the recognition and 
enforcement of FOE/I at both regional and state level.  
a) Effect of international law and international human rights regime 
push for the legalisation of FOE/I  
International law is premised on a system of sovereign states and characterized 
by the absence of legislature, judiciary and executives (Evan, 1998: 262). Sovereignty 
remains a fundamental principle of international legitimacy. This view is supported by 
Hart (1994) whose is that view that international law is ‘law’ but not a ‘legal system’ and 
thus resembles municipal law in form. 139 But international law refers to a system of 
rules that are binding on states (Evan, 1998: 261).140 So the question is whether 
international law can encompass legislative, executive, and judicative structures which 
                                                 
138
 In addition to article 19 of ICCPR, FOE/I is articulated in Article 10 of Convention on Elimination of 
Discrimination and Advancement of Wowen, Article 9 (1,4) and article 13, 17 of Convention on Rights of 
the Child article 13 (2) and 13 (3) of Convention on Migrant workers 
139
 H.L.A. Hart (1994) Chapter X. pp213-232 
140
 Evan, Graham (1998).  
-57- 
are able to perform the same functions as the legal order of a nation state, and which 
thereby overcome the defects of a primitive social order. Donnelly believes that there is 
‘evidence of changing international understanding of sovereignty’ (Donnelly, 2003: 250). 
The process of international relations alongside state sovereignty and international 
human rights regimes calls for enforcing human rights instruments at state level, thus 
states are faced with the demand to respond to human rights. Donnelly also pointed out 
that the ‘voluntary acceptance of the regime by participating states itself creates 
‘voluntary compliance’ which is the heart of the regime’s strength. (Donnelly, 2003: 138) 
 
The Charter of the United Nations denotes the rights of nation-states as 
“independence and sovereignty of equal member states and principle of non-
interference in the domestic or internal affairs of states’ (article 2). Thus, by the Charter, 
resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations are not legally binding on 
states. Institutions such as ICJ and ICC are institutions with international jurisdiction to 
compliment national legal systems. The International Court of Justice, with the status 
recognized in the Charter, can only decide on cases where both sides agree without 
enforcement power. The UDHR, and then 1966 two Covenants of human rights, 
required states to recognize human rights in their legal systems and states of practice. 
 
Success cases mainstreaming international human rights regime at the regional 
level are both the Council of Europe with the ECtHR and the European Union (EU) with 
the ECJ. 141 The experience of first the COE and then the EU showed that it first 
established constitutional ground with state’s representation and deliberation and 
market place for all members, and with legislation with direct effect for the citizens. The 
EU was first established as the European Community and has later been changed by 
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several treaties, 142 The law of the European Community was seen also as having 
constitutional qualities, the international law was attached with values and the power 
and sanctions to implement them. Although EU law takes precedence over conflicting 
national laws, in certain cases, the international human rights law, understood the 
European Convention of Human Rights, is not above the domestic law. The EU had a 
Human Rights Charter since 2001, but not as part of the treaties. From the Lisbon treaty 
of 2009 the human rights chapters were included in the treaty. 143 
b) Norm setting and legal interpretation for human rights is enhanced 
by the effect of international law.   
International human rights instruments are moving towards a common law for a 
world of community where states are acquiring the role to implement universal human 
rights instruments by accepted standards. The acceptance by states of universal human 
rights norm is crucial. Donnelly argues that human rights are universal as it is also in the 
sense of ‘’being most universally accepted, at least in work, or as ideal standards’ by 
states”. Donnelly mentioned: ...[I]nternationally recognized rights imposed obligations 
on and are exercised against sovereign territorial states. … Human rights norms have 
been largely internationalized. Their implementation, however, remains almost 
exclusively national. [In effect], contemporary international and regional human rights 
regimes are supervisory mechanisms that monitor relations between states and 
citizens. 144 
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commonly referred to as the pillar structure of the European Union. This conception of the Union divided 
it into the European Community (EC) pillar, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar, and the 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillar. The first pillar was where the EU's supra-national institutions — the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice — had the most power and 
influence. The other two pillars were essentially more intergovernmental in nature with decisions being 
made by committees composed of national politicians and officials 
143 The EU is now regulated by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), both parts of the Lisbon treaty. 
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Since 1948, European states have attempted to institutionalise  democratic and 
human rights values. Even EUmember though states retain big differences, they could 
decide on a common norm and mechanism for the European region. The challenge for 
the Council of Europe, when it extended membership to Eastern and Central Europe 
whose traditions of reconciling freedom of expression and security were significantly 
different from the Western European democracies, show that regional norms on certain 
rights and freedoms can be expanded to adopt diversity but still converge on EU 
standards. The requirement to adopt EU Law and its rules into membership applications 
has seen pressure on potential new members to achieve common standards and unity 
in application of EU law. The influential jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and European Commission of Human Rights have significantly been constructive 
to the norms and standard setting with philosophical guiding and justification of FOE/I 
to the member states. 145 In this regard, ASEAN has also seen increasing pressure on 
members to align with regional interests even when it is difficult to get consensus on 
the issues. For instance, when ASEAN’s civil society proposed suspension of Myanmar 
from the association unless it released opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from 
imprisonment during SAFFRON Revolution in 2007, many ASEAN states shared the view 
that detaining Aung San Suu Kyi is not acceptable.  
 
It is acknowledged that the achievement of human rights in Europe was not just 
one moment. Stronger regional legitimacy of human rights in Europe as an effect of 
Community Law and case law, has evolved through changes in law and practice of the 
member states. In the case of Europe, case law from the Commission and the Court help 
to facilitate a clear interpretation of community law and thus contribute to the process 
of norm setting in the region.  The practice of freedom of expression by states with 
regard to protection and restriction of the right has varied based on different concepts, 
and clearer interpretation of law has developed from case law of the Commission and 
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 The EU is the comprehensive structure with market integration and with supranationality and with the 
European Court of Justice. The ECJ did however early start an argumentation concerning human rights 
where it referred to the member states and their human rights commitments as the part of the EU even 
before the EU had formally committed to the ECHR. Human rights obligations became a part of the 
argumentation of the court - without formal obligations.  
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the Court. 146 ECHR case law could push for a strong need to reconcile the exercise of 
this freedom with the protection of other lawful rights and legitimate interests, 
including national security. 147  
 
c) Evolving regionalization of human rights mechanism  
The emergence of a new global human rights regime after the collapse of the 
Westphalia [?] grows with hope but it is not guaranteed. An international human rights 
regime is a supervisory mechanism consequence on implementation of universally 
accepted norms and standards on human rights, not as an international order at the 
state level.  
Regionalism of human rights becomes an increasingly accepted alternative to 
making human rights regimes work more effectively and more constructively. The 
notion of regionalism refers to the process of regionalisation towards regional social 
formations, organisations and institution (Close and Askew, 2004).148 In such processes, 
sovereign nation-states will increasingly come under pressure and in some case lose 
their authority and power to the international community, or to extra-, inter- and supra-
nation state forums.  
The notion of the nation-state is a political ideal to evolve to a bonded political 
community – ASEAN – whereas nation-state being less represented by factors that go 
across states such as labor, trade, human rights and terror. Alternatively, assuming that 
all interests – for examples of economic, capital, technology, labor and security focus, 
are crossing over states, there is a greater common ground to form a single community. 
To a certain extent, the lost of national sovereignty is also weakening of democracy – or 
like in the case of EU, result ‘democracy deficit’.  
   
The Constitution of European Union though does not include a statement of 
individual rights, as found in most national constitutions. But the Lisbon Treaty have 
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 J.A Andrews (1994). He commented that European Court of Human Rights found it impossible to have 
a uniform European conception of morals to guide on interpretation of rights 
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adopted Human Rights chapter and EU have adopted its Human Rights Charter in 2001. 
The Treaty recognises ECHR as guiding principles for human rights. 149 European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) declares that it would recognise and be guided by the constitutional 
principles common to Member States. 150 The ECJ approach is very important for the 
member states of EU but have not yet incorporate the ECHR into domestic law to have 
the Convention rendered directly enforceable for the community rights. Nevertheless 
there is limitations to the human rights because the ECJ is not a surrogate for the 
European Court of Human Rights which has no mandate to review the policies or actions 
of Member States on the ground of infringe the ECHR nor give interpretative guidance 
for a national court whether their national legislation was in conformity with ECHR in 
the situation which did not fall within the field of Community Law. 151 
Even though we know that the Western values for democracy and human rights 
in the human rights history dominated the global discourse, we have to acknowledge 
that the members of Council of Europe were all trying together to institutionalise 
human rights to establish a regional feasible human rights mechanism and bring the 
international human rights standards home. Knowing the experiences that global 
human rights institutions largely lack of coercive power, Council of Europe adopted 
cosmopolitan system as means to legitimately and politically enforcement of internal 
human rights commitment of nation-states. The legitimacy of the constitution bring 
effects to the regional human rights mechanism with judicial power and institution. EU 
also establishes supranational internal policy making process with both majority voting 
and national veto based on the principle of consensus and deliberate democracy. 
Directives require the member states to bring their domestic laws into conformity of the 
EU law with direct effect. With regard to FOE/I for instance, insititutional changes to 
protect better FOE/I was also made based on the case law.  For example, in the case of 
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 Treaty of European Union, Article F (2) states: “.. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
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Lingen v. Austria, the role of press in democracy by imparting information and ideas on 
political issues as on others of public interest and public watchdog was remarkly 
recognized. 152  
European Union (EU) represents sophisticated approach of supranational 
institutions. The Council of Ministers and the Commission have been given powers to 
make subsidiary legislation in the form of regulations and directives- the Community 
Law, which serve as common framework for the Member States to take measures of 
their own sovereignty. There has been cases that the measures differs, the case law of 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) revealed to uphold the principle of binding nature and 
uniform application of Community Law. The case of Johnston, ECJ rejected argument by 
the United Kingdom that the Treaty is inherent to allow the Member States to take all 
measures for reasons of public security. 153 EU law takes precedence over conflicting 
national laws and directive has direct effect that the Member States are required to 
bring their domestic laws into conformity with the directives. With regards to human 
rights, the Treaty, agreed in Maastricht recognised the rights in ECHR. This process of 
recognition has gone through time and proved by case law. Even in the process of 
considering mechanisms to protect human rights under the European human rights 
treaties, the United Kingdom also has objection to the protection of individual rights and 
judicial institutions as the European Court of Human Rights. But the member states and 
people of Europe could move ahead gradually from the dialogue-based consensus to 
resolve the differences and diversity in the region. 
The jurisprudence of European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR) and 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) shows that this is strongest machinery in 
international regime in checking backsliding, applying pressure on human rights 
progress and interpreting controversial cases of states.154 ECtHR uses doctrine of 
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‘margin of appreciation’. Sometimes, often in the case of public order, morals and 
national security, the ECHR left the case to the domestic courts to decide the matter.  
d) Pressure from globalisation and transnational actors 
Globalisation process is pushing for regionalism of human rights. The growth of 
transnational regimes becomes more proactive in favours of democracy, human rights 
and market. Transnational institutions as WTO, IMF demand nation-states to change 
their domestic policies to meet the standards of the organisation in financial and trade 
markets is a clear cut example of interference in domestic politics that the denial of 
state on the ground of absolute sovereignty would be rejected as illegitimate. 
Globalisation itself creates increasing convergences of political ideals, ideologies and 
systems as well as broadens the global acceptance of universal values and mechanism 
such as human rights, democracy and free market globally and regionally.  
Media becomes transnational actor that enables wider exercise of freedom of 
expression and access to information across borders. With the emergence of global 
media, internet or regional television and radio, the ability of state to decide what 
information they give or their citizens can access is obviously curtailed. States nowadays 
cannot easily ignore criticisms by overseas media which once was the case for the 
reason of inappropriate attempt to interfere into the internal politics. The demand by 
the international community is that democracy and free press would be permitted 
aspiration.   
 
 
-64- 
CHAPTER 5 
THE WAY FORWARD: WHAT NEEDS TO BE 
DONE FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
AND INFORMATION IN ASEAN?  
 
The preceding chapters lay out the law and context for freedom of expression 
and information. It is has been ascertained that FOE/I is a fundamental human right 
encoded in international human rights instruments. In political history and international 
relations, there were debates on this freedom during the process of development of the 
UDHR in 1948 and ICCPR in 1966 because of different political ideals on liberal rights as 
between the West and non-Western states. The dilemma of liberal rights and individual 
duties and the authority of the state to intervene in individual liberty is the core 
controversial issue in international forums. The end of the Cold War and fall of the 
Berlin Wall opened up a new phase for reconciling different political ideas in 
international relations where more dialogues for norm setting and building international 
law order and standards have been had. However, even as recently as the 1993 Vienna 
Conference, many ASEAN states, representing the East, still upheld their Asian Values or 
Asian ways in their understanding and undertaking of human rights.  
 
International human rights regimes have also been established and flourished 
over the same period. Thus, human rights are widely accepted as not solely internal 
matters of the state, but subject to global monitoring and enforcement, to the extent 
that states join international agreements. The experiences of Europe in developing 
human rights mechanisms, especially with regard to FOE/I experienced a similar 
dilemma. It took Europe a long time to establish Community Law and an effective 
regional human rights regime that now protects fundamental human rights to which 
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states no longer have sole sovereignty to intervene. FOE/I have been always restricted 
on the ground of national interest. 
 
FOE/I are now more recognized under international human rights law, but not all 
ASEAN states have ratified ICCPR. However, even in the case of ratification, the practice 
of FOE/I differs from what would be interpreted by ICCPR and international human 
rights standards. The question that follows is, if states do not participate in international 
human rights commitments, can FOE/I be protected without illegitimate restrictions 
under domestic laws?  
 
The legal review of four out of 10 ASEAN member states shows that all states 
give legality to FOE/I under their constitutions – FOE/I is a constitutional right. However, 
other laws and regulations are made that restrict this freedom. Laws and regulations, 
such as Penal Code, Media and Press Law, Internal Security Act or Computer Act, are 
placed to restrict FOE/I in legitimate ways. Looking at the state of practice, however, 
FOE/I are commonly violated as per international standards. Restrictions mostly concern 
expression of opposing political opinions, defamation and access to information from 
governments and public offices, practice of freedom of religion or expressing religious 
opinions. Press, religious groups, and other political dissidents are often restricted and, 
in some cases, trials have been conducted out of the judge’s hand. Why are states doing 
so, and why cannot FOE/I be further protected in ASEAN?  
 
The answer to this question is that the political ideologies and regimes of most 
ASEAN countries have been crafted on a history of de-colonization under long term 
dictatorships or other forms of authoritarian leaderships. This explains why ASEAN 
leaders viewed FOE/I as a threat to political stability, which is the sin qua non in 
ensuring a nation’s prosperity, growth and stability. Asian values and, in some cases, 
Confucian ways of governance, also weigh significantly in political decisions in restricting 
FOE/I. Therefore, with such political morality, restrictions on FOE/I are often made 
without the power of the rule of law at the state level. The rapid expansion of global 
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communications and telecommunication networks facilitates a vastly freer flow of 
communications and, paralleling this, has been growth in demand for information by 
individuals. In the meantime, terrorism, transnational crimes and other morally 
concerning trends are supported by communications increases and have hightened state 
concerns over security and moral issues. So the threat from FOE/I will continue. But 
governments will eventually lack ultimate power to restrict rights in illegitmate ways.  
 
The second question posed above is also addressed by identifying challenges for 
FOE/I within ASEAN states. Whilst FOE/I is a constitutional right at state level, it should 
also be constitutionalised at a regional level. This includes institutional and structural 
constraints. Until now, ASEAN states have not been able to agree on a common norm 
and standard for FOE/I. And yet, there is an effective regional human rights mechanism 
beside the recently established ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 
(AICHR). This questions the need for legalizing an ASEAN Human Rights Treaty, mandate 
and power of AICHR and possibility of the human rights court. This institutional 
arrangement showed successes from the experience of the Council of Europe, so why 
cannot ASEAN, with its 10 member states, do the same? As ASEAN states endorse the 
principle of consensus building, it could take longer for states to achieve common 
agreement on human rights norms as well as a regional mechanism. So this leads to the 
question: What can ASEAN and ASEAN member states do further in aligning FOE/I with 
international standards? 
 
First, ASEAN needs to enhance the process of regionalism for recognising human 
rights of expression and access to information into the regional sphere. ASEAN’s 
structure is based on consensus and political commitment, and has not gone further 
toward a community law or regional regime following the cosmopolitan approach as in 
Europe. This process and system may take longer to grow in ASEAN, even when learning 
from the experiences of other regions. ASEAN, as a region, has many issues and matters 
of governance that must be addressed beyond the territtorial sovereignity of the state. 
With that direction, ASEAN may also need to evolve into a constitutional and 
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supranational model when it becomes more mature. Nevertheless, in terms of human 
rights, ASEAN states are no doubt becoming closer and collectively linked to global 
human rights regimes in the construction of a regional human rights regime and 
international relations. But since the process of consensus-building is based on 
diplomacy, ASEAN is shown as having a weak capacity to enforcement its new-born 
human rights mechanism. The inter-governmental regional human rights commission 
(AICHR) has not got power as an important community of government representatives 
on human rights discussions. But, in the future, it may be transformed into a more 
structured and empowered body to advise states as well as to monitor the human rights 
situation in the region.  
 
Second, dialogues for norm setting and interpretation of FOE/I should be 
strengthened. States and human rights issues become both interdependent and 
interconnected and this leaves the ASEAN Charter as a living instrument that evolves in 
a process of socialization. Protection of FOE/I can only be strengthened by reconciling 
the legal cultures and practices of member states. This means that ASEAN will develop 
its norms by means of building consensus, cooperation and accommodation of political 
and cultural diversity. But dialogues should not only be by conduct of conventional 
diplomacy but by means of open discussions between states and international human 
rights regimes. The reports to HRC and the reports of the Special Rapporteur would be 
anexcellent basis for building understanding on the matter. There is a gradual transition 
from moral concepts to a legal position on human rights. Since ASEAN has its own 
normative legality, standards on FOE/I and a regional mechanism, member states may 
feel more comfortable to adopt and comply.  
 
Third, the exercise of FOE/I, or in other words freedom, can only be restricted in 
legitimate ways when a state has the political will to make constitutional responses to 
the issue of freedom as per international standards. As the regional system of law and its 
enforcement is strengthened, states will adopt and adjust in their domestic systems. In 
the end, states take responsibility for guaranteeing freedom at state level. Experiences 
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from many European Union member states, as they have endorsed Community law, is 
that states have been required to adjust their constitutions and domestic legal systems 
in line with regional law. The Human Rights Commission and the Court have power to 
advise or to rule over cases where states should also take into account the need to 
adjust if their legal systems and judicial practices do not meet the standards. Over the 
past few decades, many ASEAN States have undertaken the constitutional building 
process which gives rise to democracy and human rights including FOE/I. So the matter 
at hand is that ASEAN states can already refer to international standards to ensure the 
legality of FOE/I and to guarantee the legitimacy of any restrictions on freedom of 
expression and information, especially on the ground of national security.  
 
"We believe that the dream of a true ASEAN community and the formation of an 
ASEAN human rights body must recognize free expression, press freedom, and people's 
access to information as essential to human rights". 155 But to do this, ASEAN as an 
association and community will need to take on stronger consensus-building processes 
and ensure that all member states and their citizens can participate in these processes. 
ASEAN can apply a legal approach in its regionalism and norm setting for every human 
right and freedom. 
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